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The nascent modernisation of the Armed Forces is not only a vital task for the state but also, I stress, for the nation as a whole.

It should be said that much has been done in the past few years. Regular financing of the national defence system has been developed. The legal and doctrinal base has been renewed. Serious organisational and staff changes have been carried out in the Armed Forces.

We have passed over from radical reforms, which were necessary at a certain stage, to a consistent strategic development of the Armed Forces. We have launched deep reforms, which should result in expanding the possibilities of the army. In fact, we are creating a fundamentally new image of the Armed Forces.

In view of this I will again point out the priority spheres of military development.
The first task is to improve the manning principles. We must firmly comply with the established parameters and deadlines. The creation of professional permanent readiness units must be completed by 2007. At the same time, we must reduce the length of service by conscription. We know about this; we have discussed this; the relevant decisions were made jointly with you and, in fact, at your suggestion. We must also decide the issue of attracting citizens of other countries to professional service in the Russian army.

I would like to remind you that relevant amendments to legislation have been submitted to the State Duma. They will allow us to grant Russian citizenship to those who have served in the Russian army for at least three years in a simplified procedure.

The second task is rearmament. We have adopted vital basic documents in this sphere. They set the landmarks of technical rearmament of troops and link military development with the tasks of military-technical and military-industrial policy. All tasks set in the State Armaments Programmes and Basic Principles of the Military-Technical Policy are feasible. We have the ability to fulfil them successfully.

In addition, we must continue working to consolidate the defence industries and create big and competitive holdings.

We also need a fundamentally new system of mobilisation training geared to modern demands and the nature of new threats.

And lastly, we must create a truly modern system of logistics, material-technical supplies and social protection of the Armed Forces. Social protection of servicemen should include not only a consistent growth of their monetary remuneration, though this is very important, but also in such modern projects as the development of the system of insurance and mortgage crediting for servicemen. Another immediate task is to provide re-training to servicemen and expand their possibilities in civilian vocations.

I would like to say a few words about one more vital project. Since 1992 the Armed Forces have been more than halved. It was truly a difficult and painful process. This is enough. As of now, the process of reductions has been completed on the whole.
It should be noted also that the general/private ratio in the Russian army has become smaller than in the armies of the USA, Britain and France. Much is being said about our army being topheavy. Well, this is not true as of now.

I believe that today we have a balanced strength geared to modern defence sufficiency requirements. And we do not plan further major reductions in strength of the Armed Forces.

Changes in the world order and the appearance of new threats call for a regular military-strategic analysis of the situation. In modern conditions, when the situation changes dynamically, the army must be prepared for reacting adequately to arising threats. This is why its structures, combat abilities, tactics and operational structure must be flexible and mobile.

Russia has been working consistently to strengthen the system of international law. It is trying to develop broad cooperation with foreign states and international organisations in the area of security.

But this does not mean that we should pay less attention to, let alone stop developing our defence capabilities. Eventually, these capabilities are the guarantor of sovereignty and security of Russia.

We need a strong, professional and well-equipped army for a peaceful and beneficial development of the country. The army must be prepared to defend Russia and its allies.

It must effectively collaborate with the armed forces of other countries. It must be prepared to tackle collective security problems, fight terrorism, and take part in peacekeeping operations together with its partners.

And it must fight common threats in the zones of our regional responsibility, jointly with its closest allies, of course.

On the whole, the Russian Armed Forces need a new quality in everything - combat training, military planning, and military science. We are facing a challenging task of creating a new image of the army and the entire military organisation of the state.

I am convinced that you are well aware of the responsibilities of the supreme commanders and the officers' corps as a whole in this connection.
The Report by Sergei IVANOV, 
Defence Minister 
of the Russian Federation:

We have come here not only to sum up the results of a difficult reform period in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the military organisation of the country as a whole. We have come here because the leadership of the Defence Ministry is ready to present a comprehensive vision of the basic avenues of development of the Armed Forces.

We have been encouraged to speed up our work but the main thing for the leadership of the Defence Ministry is the quality of assessments and responsibility for decisions. However, the time has come when we can say responsibly that we know now where to proceed and how.

For the past few years the Russian Armed Forces have been in the eye of difficult processes of the reform of the new Russian statehood. Despite the difficulties of that period, we have scored serious achievements. I offer you a digested review of them.

To begin with, we have elaborated legislation for the development of the Armed Forces. Laws on the role and place of the Armed Forces in the military organisation and their role in ensuring external and internal security of Russia have been drafted and adopted. A system of collaboration with other power departments of the country, in which the Armed Forces play the key role, has been elaborated. This system of relations between departments fully corresponds to the interests of national security and was elaborated on the basis of presidential instructions.
A system of political control of the operation of the Armed Forces and the foundations of public control have been created.

This is a vital element of the development of the Armed Forces in the context of the developing rule of law and civil society in Russia. The military budget has become much more open.

Structural changes have been made in the Russian Armed Forces to ensure greater effectiveness of the command system. The Armed Forces have been transformed into a three-service and three-arm structure, which better suits modern demands.

The main strength reductions of the Armed Forces have been completed. We must admit that it was a painful process, and not only because of the scale of reductions but also because of the economic crisis that hit the country at the time. However, the Russian Armed Forces survived that trial. No further major reductions are stipulated in the Armed Forces; their strength has been brought to the level of defence sufficiency, which equals approximately 1 million servicemen. In 1993 the Armed Forces of Russia had 2.75 million troops.

The time of the biggest expenses under the Military Reform item - mostly spending on the construction of housing for retiring servicemen - is past.

Major changes have taken place in the system of manning the Armed Forces. We are energetically going over to recruiting contract servicemen to the posts of privates and sergeants.

Conditions have been created for a modern system of social insurance of servicemen, though several major problems, in particular the provision of housing to servicemen, have not been solved yet.

The Russian military policy has been adjusted to modern global realities. One of them is a fundamentally new level of political relations with the USA and other industrialised countries. This has allowed us to make considerable reductions in the arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons without detriment to national security.

And lastly, we have created a new system of Russia's relations with allies and partners. It is based above all on the transparency of all military-political obligations.

On the whole, it can be said that capital restructuring within the framework of the military reform has been completed. The positive results we have attained give us a chance to go over from the period of survival of the Armed Forces to full-scale military development.

The main task now is to change the foundations of planning the development of the Armed Forces. Military planning must proceed not on the basis of the available military possibilities but with due regard for the genuine security requirements of the country. In other words, we must think not what the Armed Forces can do with the military possibilities inherited from the Soviet Union, but how the available possibilities must be transformed and developed to ensure protection of the country's interests.

The elaboration of genuine priorities of military development of the Armed Forces should be a realistic view of the specific elements of the geopolitical situation in the world, which is extremely complicated and dynamic. Military
power is used as an instrument of foreign policy very frequently to this day.

Of special significance for the military-political situation in the world are new challenges and tasks in the area of international security, such as the need to hinder the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, fight international terrorism, ethnic and religious radicalism, drug trafficking, and organised crime.

Economic interests are gaining significance in global politics. This objectively expands the sphere of application of military power. International operations involving the use of force outside traditional military-political organisations but within temporary coalitions created for the purpose are becoming a fact of life.

A correct evaluation of these global trends and understanding of the main directions of their development will promote a more realistic assessment of the system of threats to the national security of Russia.

We envisage three types of threats whose neutralisation is the function, to one degree or another, of the Armed Forces of Russia: external, internal, and transborder threats.

Please note that we face fundamentally novel aspects even in the sphere of seemingly classical external threats. In particular, relatively new for the Russian military planning are such external threats as interference in the internal affairs of Russia by foreign states or organisations supported by foreign states; instability in border countries engendered by the weakness of their central governments; and some other threats.

I would like to point to the growing role of the Armed Forces in repelling such a threat as programmes concerned with the creation of weapons of mass destruction or getting access to especially dangerous types of weapons carried out by states, coalitions of states, or public-political movements.

The specific features of modern external threats call on the Russian Armed Forces to fulfil versatile tasks in different parts of the world. Neither can we rule out the possibility of pre-emptive use of military force if the interests of Russia or its allied obligations require it.

The most important internal threats whose neutralisation is the task of the Armed Forces include:

- the use of force in an attempt to change the constitutional regime and violate the territorial integrity of Russia;
- the creation, equipment, training and operation of illegal armed formations;
- illegal circulation (trafficking) in the territory of Russia of weapons, munitions, explosives, and so on;
- large-scale operation of organised crime that threatens the political stability on the scale of a constituent member of the Russian Federation;
- the operation of separatist and radical religious-nationalist movements in the Russian Federation.

Special mention should be made of transborder threats. These are threats to the security of Russia which, though internal in form, are external in essence. They are:

- the operation of structures connected with the international terrorist community in the territory of Russia;
- the training in the territory of other states of armed groups for operation in the territory of Russia or its allies;
- transborder crime, including smuggling and other illegal actions, which calls for the use of border guards.
The need to repel the transborder threats to the security of Russia will feature more prominently in Russian military plans.

The Armed Forces of Russia will take part in neutralising internal and transborder threats together with other power departments on the basis of the Constitution and legislation of Russia. We regard it as irresponsible in this complicated time for the country to limit the prerogatives of the army to external threats.

Proof of the correctness of our policy is the struggle against terrorism. Internal and international terrorism has integrated in the past few years, so that a kind of "terrorist international" has become a fact of life. Against this background, it is useless to try to divide terrorism into internal and international. The experience of Chechnya has taught us many things.

It is while repelling the threat that looked as an internal revolt in Chechnya that Russia came across external aggression on the part of international terrorist organisations.

It should be noted that nuclear weapons may regain their characteristics of an instrument of war. We have detected attempts to use certain technological achievements in order to turn nuclear weapons from an instrument of deterrence into a weapon of the field of battle. We believe this is an extremely dangerous trend, which is undermining global and regional stability. I have ordered close monitoring of these processes because even a minor lowering of the ceiling of the use of nuclear weapons will force Russia to revise the system of troop control and the principles of their combat use.

At the same time it can be said that on the whole the level of direct military threat to the security of Russia is insignificant. Not a single conflict situation outside Russia’s borders is creating a direct military threat to national security.

However, it would be irresponsible to evaluate the level of military threat to Russia’s security only from the viewpoint of modern realities.

We must learn to predict the situation several steps ahead.

I can tell you frankly that in the foreseeable future Russian military planning will depend on a number of uncertainty factors. An uncertainty factor is a situation, a conflict or political and military-political processes whose development can seriously change the geopolitical situation in the region of Russia’s priority interests or create a direct threat to its security. We regard the internal situation and the state of stability in the CIS countries and regions bordering on them as such factors.

Modern military planning should also take into account the experience gained during the armed conflicts of the end of the past century and the beginning of the 21st century. A correct evaluation of such experience calls for abandoning stereotypes.

Those who do not do this and continue to operate in old categories are doomed to defeat. Frankly speaking, we must overhaul our views on modern armed conflicts and ways of attaining victory in them.

No dominant type of armed conflicts developed in the past period. This means that combat training, operational planning and military-technical supplies must be maximally flexible. It is also clear that the former concept of conventional wars, both limited and large-scale ones, is undergoing major changes. This means that we should train for
ordinary warfare, guerrilla wars, and struggle against different forms of terrorism. Most conflicts developed in limited territories within the boundaries of one theatre of war but with a broad use of forces and resources deployed beyond it. This means that we must be prepared not only to repel an external aggression but also be able to carry combat operations, one way or another, over to the territory of the adversary.

It is apparent that the aviation component is the main strike force in modern conflicts. And those who continue to think that tank strikes will be crucial in modern wars, just as they were crucial during World War Two, are living in the past. The enemy will not come in a tank; the enemy will fly a plane or deliver weapons by air.

It is clear that success in a modern war will go to him who will be able to functionally integrate all information flows and correct combat use plans depending on changes in the situation in real time. This means that the operational structure of groups of forces should include a reconnaissance and information centre operating within the global time frame; an automated and highly protected system of troops and arms control; and, the main thing, an aerospace echelon with both reconnaissance and strike functions. A modern war will also call for increasing the stability of communications and troops control systems.

I would like to say a few words about new trends in the art of war.

First, the principle of concentration of forces and resources in the crucial direction, which has existed since olden times, should be geared to new realities. It should be implemented mostly through massive use of fire systems. The new long-range systems sometimes allow the replacement of troops manoeuvres and concentration with the trajectory manoeuvre with the purpose of delivering massive fire strikes at specified groups of forces. And strike groups will be advanced to the main strike directions at the last possible moment.

Second, the relation between strategy, operational art and tactic has changed, though these categories of military art retain their significance. The exploitation of the results of strikes by strategic forces and the final routing of enemy groups will depend on the success of operational and tactical combat actions.

Third, external and internal elements of warfare will change. Warfare will be a strictly coordinated block of actions by a large number of arms, services and special troops fulfilling a vast number of complicated and interconnected strategic, operational and tactical tasks simultaneously in all spheres of warfare.

Fourth, the methods of the use of troops in offensive and defensive operations will become increasingly similar. In future, offensive operations will be a combination of fire and electronic strikes.

The growing range and effectiveness of fire systems will call for reviewing methods of troop dispersion along the frontline and in depth, in both offensive and defensive operations, moving the deployment sites of fire systems further away from waiting and deployment areas, second echelons and reserves. The importance of creating sufficiently strong and well protected groups of land forces that will be able not only to repel enemy attacks after suffering massive air strikes, but also to immediately launch (possibly in
autonomous units or groups) offensive operations in direct contact with the land troops of the enemy, will grow. We must turn the no-contact war into a contact one already at the initial stage, as a contact war is what the enemy armed with long-range precision-guided weapons wants to avoid.

**Fifth**, the growing distance of fire attacks will be a distinguishing feature of tactical operations of the future. Troops will have the technical ability to do considerable damage to the adversary long before coming into direct contact with him. These new weapons will ensure the continuity of the offensive, the surprise and speed factors, high activity, manoeuvrability, and stability of the troops. Another specific feature of fighting will be the prevention of air raids and their repulsion, as well as struggle for air superiority.

**Sixth**, of special significance will be the ability of the troops to quickly disrupt the political and economic management infrastructure of the adversary, as well as systems of communications and electronic warfare.

**Seventh**, of crucial role in a war will be a well protected and interference-resistant air defence system capable of waging an effective struggle against all air vehicles of the opponent, including with Stealth technology. The air defence system must be echeloned and structured at three levels:

- a strategic air defence system with elements of protection against cruise and ballistic missiles;
- a target air defence system that would protect the most important military, political and humanitarian elements of the infrastructure;
- an air defence system of the land forces, which would neutralise the adversary’s attempts to win air superiority over the field of battle.

I want to draw your attention to the fact that peaceful civilians were the first victims of air strikes in recent conflicts. Consequently, reliable air defence is necessary above all for the protection of the people.

**Eighth**, while planning an aggression, the adversary will take a large number of measures to conceal the beginning and the nature of his preparations. An effective method of doing this would be a special operation of deception, which would include a package of interconnected and carefully harmonised methods of deceiving the other side concerning one’s intentions.

**Ninth**, though air superiority and massive use of precision-guided weapons will remain crucial for the outcome of the warfare, they do not rule out massive ground operations waged by land forces. Excessive dependence on air support will be a limiting factor in the use of armed forces. We note the growing importance of theatre air defence systems.

There is one more specific feature of modern wars, which I must speak about. It is the growing role of morale. The defeat of outwardly powerful armies in recent conflicts was ensured, in part, by their moral degradation. We must create without delay a truly and not a formally effective system of moral and psychological conditioning of servicemen. We must use the best of our military traditions and also take into account changes in the structure of our society and new democratic values.

The new foreign policy situation of the past years and the structure of military threats to the security of Russia determine also the nature of tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces. We divide them into four basic groups:
1. Deterrence of military and military-political threats to the security of the Russian Federation, including the ensurance of strategic stability and territorial defence of the country.

2. Ensurance of economic and political interests of the Russian Federation, which can include operations with the use of the Armed Forces by decision of the President.

3. Implementation of peacetime military operations, including the fulfilment of allied obligations by the Russian Federation and peacekeeping operations under the UN or CIS mandates. It should be said that we are pondering the idea of creating a separate permanent peacekeeping brigade within the Land Forces in 2004.

4. Use of military force to neutralise a military threat, including in conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Taking into account the above, it can be said that the Russian Armed Forces must be able to:
- in peacetime and in emergency situations: carry out their tasks in two armed conflicts of any type simultaneously, as well as wage peacekeeping operations independently and as part of multinational groups, while preserving the strategic deterrence capability and using permanent readiness units to fulfil arising tasks without additional mobilisation;
- in case of aggravation of the military-political and military-strategic situation: ensure the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and contain the escalation of the situation by using strategic deterrence forces and manoeuvring permanent-readiness forces;
- in wartime: use available forces to repel an aerospace attack of the adversary and, following full-scale strategic deployment, fulfil tasks in two local wars simultaneously.

Acting on this understanding of the global military-political situation and tasks of the Armed Forces of Russia, we can formulate the basic priorities of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I will speak only about some of them.

To increase the number of permanent-readiness units and formations and use them to create groups of forces.

The strategic task in this area, with due regard for the experience of combat application, is to create groups of forces under common command, capable of fulfilling combat tasks with peacetime strength. The core of such groups of forces shall be permanent-readiness units and formations.

Permanent-readiness units and formations are such units and formations that can fulfil combat tasks in both peacetime and wartime without additional mobilisation resources. Permanent-readiness groups of forces shall be created in all strategic directions. Their composition will differ depending on the scale of threats to the national security of Russia. They should be sufficiently mobile to be able to move, in case of need, to any region to fulfil the task of localising potential armed conflicts and routing the enemy. The increase of the number of permanent-readiness units and formations and their ability to be airlifted by military transports over large distances should be regarded as the key priority of the development of the Russian Armed Forces in the next few years.

To step up the transition of the Armed Forces to manning by contract.

The transition of the Armed Forces to manning by contract is not the end goal but a means of fulfilling the tasks of
ensuring the defence ability of Russia and raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The decision on transition to manning by contract is not a mere political declaration. It has been substantiated financially and organisationally and is a result of long work to evaluate the objective possibilities of the country.

The first experience we have gathered shows that to attain the main goal of this project, we must get sufficient and regular allocations, as well as create a developed personnel base for replenishing troops with contract servicemen who have the required skills. Much will have to be done in this sphere yet.

This is why we have elaborated and adopted the Federal target programme of transition to recruiting contract servicemen to the posts of privates and sergeants in 2004-2007.

The State Duma will soon receive draft laws that will allow us not to wage experiments but to consistently man permanent-readiness units and formations in accordance with the new principles.

The implementation of the programme of partial transition to contract service in the Armed Forces will not cancel the need to have a trained mobilisation reserve. On the contrary, I will demand more effective work in this direction.

To improve the combat training of the troops.

The operations and combat training of the Armed Forces must proceed with due regard for changes in the direction of military and other threats to Russia, guaranteed fulfilment of tasks of ensuring military security of the country, new trends in the nature of warfare and methods of troop operation, operational designation of groups of forces, and specific features of the field of battle and potential adversary.

A major breakthrough has been attained in raising the standards of combat training. The number of exercises and combat training programmes in 2002 in all services of the Armed Forces was larger than in 2001, and the mean spending on combat training grew by 2.2 times. This trend further strengthened in the first nine months of 2003. The draft budget of the Defence Ministry for 2004 stipulates the allocation of 16% of all funds to the development of the system of combat training. The spotlight should be on the training of battalions as the main tactical units in local and border armed conflicts, as well as peacekeeping operations.

I can also say that the exercises planned for 2004 will spotlight training in mobility of various forces and resources, including inter-theatre regrouping of forces. We should proceed from the assumption that our troops will most frequently confront an adversary that would mostly consist of different type formations actively using guerrilla and subversive-terrorist tactics.

To preserve the capability of strategic deterrence forces.

The main goal of Russia’s policy in the area of strategic deterrence is to preclude any use of force or aggression as a means of pressure on Russia or its allies. If deterrence fails, we must ensure guaranteed protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of Russia or its allies. Deterrence will be based on the ability to take reply actions designed to do damage that would put in question the attainment of the goals of potential aggression.
The fulfilment of these and other tasks of the development of the Armed Forces, in particular the acquisition of novel military hardware and assistance to prospective research and development projects, will allow us to create truly modern Armed Forces.

I must say a few words about the social component of the development of the Russian Armed Forces.

The solution of the housing problem, as well as the raising of the monetary remuneration of servicemen, will be the basis of the social policy of the Defence Ministry. We must say frankly that the housing problem cannot be solved in a year or two.

The current system of housing provision to servicemen must be overhauled. We must not only increase allocations to the construction of housing but also immediately go over to the accumulation system of housing provision to servicemen.

At present the service housing stock of the Defence Ministry includes only 98,000 flats. We need about 450,000 service flats to provide guaranteed housing to each active serviceman.

Calculations show that the problem will be solved no sooner than in 2012-2015. To do it, we should not only build new flats but also turn barracks and other structures released during the planned reduction in force into service housing.

This is the reality. But only an accelerated creation of a sufficient stock of service housing combined with the State Housing Certificates programme designed for 2002-2010 and the accumulation system of housing provision to servicemen will allow us to get out of this seeming deadlock.

The Russian Government has approved a plan of drafting normative legal acts and taking measures designed to ensure transition to the accumulation system of housing provision to servicemen. The programme, which is being elaborated by the Defence Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, will create a fundamentally new mechanism of guaranteed housing provision to servicemen. In fact, it stipulates the accumulation of budgetary funds on the personal account of each serviceman so that it would be enough for buying a well appointed flat in different regions of Russia after 20 years of service, with bonus additions to the account for additional service, which will encourage servicemen to stay in the Armed Forces.

The current system has put everything upside down: if you want a flat, retire. This means that there is no impetus for continued service, as both a warrant serviceman who has served ten years and a general with 30 years of service have the same housing rights.

Consequently, transition to the accumulation system will ensure social justice, encourage service, and confirm that servicemen are citizens with a special status.

When trying to solve the housing and other problems, we get the assistance of many governors and other heads of executive branches of authority at different levels.

Another vital element of military development is the integration of the supply system of the Armed Forces and other troops of Russia through transition to inter-arm technical supply and logistic systems. The main goal of this transition is to raise the effectiveness of technical supplies and logistics of all military formations by integrating relevant agen-
cies of the power ministries and departments of Russia, as well as joint rational use of the available material and technical base and infrastructure.

The timely provision of modern weapons and military hardware to the Armed Forces would be impossible without the streamlining of the system of orders for weapons and military hardware in accordance with modern demands.

A total of 20 general clients of weapons and military hardware have been stipulated for the Armed Forces (there were 57 of them in 1997 and 29 in 1999).

Seeking to reduce the number of clients, we slashed the number to one client per arm and service of the Armed Forces. Each of them shall be responsible for the implementation of basic provisions of the military-technical policy in its area.

To centralise orders for and supply of weapons and military hardware in the Defence Ministry and other agencies that have military groups, and to streamline spending and preclude overlapping in the sphere of acquisition, reception and supplies, Presidential Decree No. 311 of March 11, 2003, established the State Defence Order Committee at the Defence Ministry of Russia.

The modernisation of the Armed Forces calls for constant improvement of professional knowledge and skills of the officers’ corps. Today we are paying for years wasted without combat training. Some officers have lost the skills of operating hardware and forgotten that instructions, orders and manuals are frequently written in blood. Hence the dramatic catastrophes of the past few years provoked by the human factor.

This means that serious changes must be made in the system of training and, first and foremost, in military education.

The improvement of the system of education is on the agenda also because of the partial transition of the Armed Forces to manning by contract.

Officers must be able to effectively command their subordinates, who sometimes have great life experience, a high level of education, etc.

To solve the most complicated problems of military education, on May 27, 2002 the Russian Government adopted a federal programme of “Reforming the System of Military Education in Russia by 2010.”

In the next few years, the system of military education will be upgraded with due regard for the creation of an interdepartmental system of training personnel in military professions for the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and agencies.

The tested practice of training future officers at military chairs of civilian higher schools and their subsequent conscription to the Armed Forces looks like a promising project. The training of reserve officers at these chairs is a separate issue. On the mass scale, it does not satisfy the tuition parameters, training too many officers in some professions and too few in others.

As a result, the military require only 10% of specialists trained at these chairs. Lop-sided lobbying in the past years created a situation where the number of chairs training specialists in obscure military professions, which the Defence Ministry does not need in such numbers, mushroomed. We should apparently raise the question of paying these chairs
depending on the fulfilment of plans set to them. This would encourage the preservation of profitable military chairs and result in the reduction of unprofitable ones.

Since olden times, the outcome of battles has depended not on weapons but on the humans who operate powerful hardware, their fighting spirit and morale. Hence, the issues of indoctrination and military discipline have always been and will for ever remain among the priorities of commanders at all levels.

The high fighting spirit and morale of servicemen do not appear out of the blue. They are a result of conscious and persistent influence on the world outlook, intellect, morale and psyche of individuals and the whole people.

The crime situation has a serious effect on servicemen. Continued attempts are made by the criminals to infiltrate the Armed Forces.

However, despite the strong negative influence of the complex of objective factors on the crime situation in the Armed Forces, they remain a law-abiding institution of the state. Crime in the Armed Forces is two times lower than the average for the country.

I would like to say in conclusion that the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces has a clear-cut programme of facilitating their development and effectiveness. It is based on a realistic view of the possibilities of the state and the tasks facing Russia in the process of integration into the modern system of international relations.

We are not rattling our sabres. On the contrary, we view military power as the extreme measure that should be applied only when all other possibilities have been exhausted. We believe that interaction with different state institutions greatly simplifies the attainment of Russia’s foreign policy goals. But it does not provide full and unconditional guarantees of national security.

Only the existence of highly efficient Armed Forces can provide such guarantees.

I am satisfied to say that the period of crisis development of the Russian military organization has ended. The difficulties we have been facing of late are growth problems and not signs of degradation. The main thing now is to ensure consistent development of the military organisation within the framework of the outlined development priorities.

In the 21st century, Russia must have the Armed Forces that would be consistent with its status of a great power.
The Concluding Address
by Vladimir PUTIN,
President of the Russian Federation:

The main thing is that we know what army we want to have and what tasks it must be ready to fulfil.

On the whole, I accept the assessments and suggestions voiced today. But we must solve a number of serious tasks in the near future.

We must precisely and correctly place accents in military planning. This is an extremely responsible task. We must also take into account the dynamics of the military-political situation and the real possibilities of our economy.

Besides, we must clearly and promptly implement all decisions on the rearmament of our Armed Forces.

We have discussed broadly and at length the relevant issues, especially with the General Staff and the economic block of the government. We must create a weighty research, technological and industrial basis for the creation of prospective weapon systems. At the same time, we must consistently increase the provision of novel hardware to the Armed Forces.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the troops must cleverly and quickly learn to use these complicated weapons, command and communication systems. This task should also be spotlighted by you, the top commanding staff of the army and navy.

Please do not forget other tasks, such as the upgrading of the standards of operations and combat training, the new principles of manning, and the streamlining of troops composition.

We must also carry on the reform of military education and work to create an integrated system of logistics for the Armed Forces and other military formations.

We have not done everything we had decided to do. The military organisation of the state is not optimal yet. I want to stress that we should be guided in this sphere not by departmental interests but by the economic possibilities of the state.

It should be remembered that transition to military development planning based on target programmes is taking too long. Meanwhile, without it military planning will remain expensive and ineffective. The nuclear deterrence forces are and will remain for a long time the main pillar of Russia’s national security. Their combat
readiness standards are very high and we have development plans for them, which are being implemented. I can tell you what the Defence Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the Strategic Missile Force know very well. It is not a state secret: Russia has a considerable stock of land-based strategic missiles. I mean the most formidable missiles, the UR-100 NUTTKh (SS-19). They constitute a very serious capability.

They have not been on combat duty for a single day. They have been kept in dry storage and, though they had not been produced today or yesterday, they are, in a sense, new weapons with a considerable service life. And their combat abilities, including the ability to evade any ballistic missile defence systems, are unmatched.

Russia has always respected and will continue to respect its international obligations in the sphere of limitation of the international nuclear potential. Meanwhile, the treaty I have mentioned allows the parties to have a substantial stock in storage. Russia will use all possibilities offered by this treaty. The heavy missiles we have will be put on combat duty when the service life of missiles on combat duty now expires.

Consequently, we have enough time to create novel weapons for the 21st century in a planned manner, without rushing the project but by working consistently and systematically. I want to say that Russia has made a great deal in this sphere. I will closely monitor the fulfilment of these plans and planned modernisation programmes, proceeding from our interests and the arising global situation. We will collaborate with all partner states, including in very sensitive areas, such as the creation of ballistic missile defence systems. We discussed the principles of this work in detail at the meeting with the US President in Camp David.

To sum up our work today, I want to say that now that we have elaborated a common understanding of what should be done I ask you to formulate this understanding in the form of practical plans. I ask the General Staff to submit its proposals on planning this work. I want to remind you that we have recently adopted a decision on granting the General Staff the leading position in the development of the military organisation of the state. I hope the General Staff will take up this task and fulfil it.
INTRODUCTION

The combat composition, structure and strength of the Armed Forces and their armaments and combat training have always depended on the objective conditions in the state, its role and place in the global community and in the system of international relations.

Russia, which has entered a new stage of historical development, is reforming the foundations of state structure and control, reviewing the system of national values, co-ordinating the interests of the individual, society and the state, and developing socio-economic, political, legal, and ethnic ties and relations. Its attitude to national security has changed, which casts a new light on the role and place of Russia in the world. Within this paradigm, Russia’s relations with the USA and other industrialised countries are seen as elements of the system of partnership and an instrument of solving its security problems.

The current stage of global development is noted for acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions. The demise of the bipolar bloc system has greatly changed the principles of strategic stability in the world. Global and regional security is shifting from the clear-cut questions of war and peace to more vague and complicated political, financial-economic, ethnic-national, demographic and other problems.

There are certain permanent security elements for Russia, whose western regions face Europe and America, southern regions, the extremely heterogeneous Islamic world, and eastern regions, Asia and Asia Pacific. Consequently, the European, Middle Eastern, South West Asian, Central Asian, and Asia Pacific regions are of logical interest for Russia’s national security.

Contrary to many dominant views in the first half of the 1990s, the significance of military power in the post-bipolar world has not diminished. Moreover, the early 21st century witnesses the growth of the role of military power in ensuring political and economic interests of states, while a number of political institutions in the sphere of international security have entered a period of grave crisis. This put on the agenda the task of revising the entire system of questions pertaining to the main aspects of international security and the principles of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.

The strong Russian Armed Forces have a geopolitical significance. Now that a number of international security institutions are weakening, the strengthening of the Russian Armed Forces will be a factor that may prevent the final dissolution of the system of international relations based on the principles of international law. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can ensure global stability in the broad meaning of the word.

The modern military policy of Russia is a component part of the policy of national security and is based on the provisions of the National Security Concept and the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia. After a lengthy reform period, the Russian Armed Forces overcame their crisis and are developing fundamentally new standards in terms of combat readiness, effectiveness, and the ability to ensure Russia’s political and economic interests.

That the development and military planning in the Russian Armed Forces is now based on the geopolitical requirements of Russia and the principle of defence sufficiency, rather than the actually available potential, is proof of their maturity and the fact that they have overcome the most difficult period in their development.

This report puts forth the basic views of the leadership of the Defence Ministry on the specific features of the development of the Armed Forces in the foreseeable future.
I. THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES: APPROACHING A NEW DEVELOPMENT STAGE

The Russian Armed Forces have covered a difficult road since the attainment of Russian sovereignty. Like the country as a whole, they underwent serious reforms precipitated by major changes in the geopolitical situation in the world and the rise of the new Russian statehood. In point of fact, the Russian Armed Forces were in the centre of the creation of a new paradigm of national security of Russia. Acting in conditions of limited funds and ongoing reforms of the socio-economic structure of society, the political leadership set the task of carrying out large-scale quantitative and qualitative changes in the Armed Forces.

A COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS FORMULATED DURING THE MILITARY REFORM

During the military reform, the President and the Federal Assembly adopted a number of vital legal acts on the structure of relations between state agencies connected with the military organisation of the country. The fundamental documents in the military sphere are Federal Law No. 61-FZ "On Defence" of 31 May 1996; Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ "On Martial Law" of 30 January 2002; Federal Law No. 53-FZ "On Military Duty and Military Service" of 28 March 1998; Federal Law No. 31-FZ "On Mobilisation Preparation and Mobilisation in the Russian Federation" of 26 February 1997; and Law No. 4730-1 "On the State Border" of 1 April 1993. Other vital documents are the Military Doctrine (approved by presidential Decree No. 706 of 21 April 2000), the Guidelines of the State Policy of the Russian Federation for Military Development Until 2010 (approved by the President on 7 August 2002), and the Regulations on the Defence Ministry and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (approved by presidential Decree No. 1357 of 11 November 1998).

A SYSTEM OF POLITICAL CONTROL HAS BEEN CREATED AND THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SYSTEM OF PUBLIC CONTROL OF THE OPERATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN LAIRED

The adoption of the aforementioned legal acts and the development of comprehensive legislative and judicial power in Russia led to the creation of a system of civil control of the Armed Forces, which fully meets the requirements of a democratic political system. Despite certain difficulties, the basis was laid for public control of the operation of the Armed Forces. The Defence Ministry maintains regular collaboration with a number of public
organisations that constitute the nascent civil society in Russia.

The defence budget has become more open; many of its previously confidential items have been declassified. As a result, the State Duma now can work on the defence budget in greater detail and strictly control its fulfilment. We can now speak about unprecedented transparency of information on issues of military policy and army reform. Proof of civil control of the Armed Forces is the number of complaints and proceedings instituted against the Defence Ministry in arbitration and general courts, which grew from 2,746 in 2000 to 3,778 in 2001 to 3,507 in 2002.

At the same time, it should be said that the effectiveness of civil control of the military sphere depends on the availability of profound military knowledge in the control agencies. Without such knowledge, the best of intentions in this area can be distorted by skin-deep or warped notions and judgements of the situation in the Armed Forces; they can take ugly forms or fall victim to the pacifist myths of the "original sinfulness" of all servicemen in general.

BASIC STRUCTURAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES TO RAISE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The Russian Armed Forces have been changed to a three-service system, which better fits the current requirements, ensures a more effective combat use, simplifies interaction between the services, and makes the system of troop command cheaper. Structurally, the Russian Armed Forces consist today of three services:
> the Land Forces,
> the Air Force, and
> the Navy,
and three arms:
> the Strategic Missile Force,
> the Space Force, and
> the Airborne Force,
as well as other forces that are not incorporated into the services, such as logistics and construction and billeting. The improvement of their structure will continue until 2010.

THE BASIC REDUCTION IN FORCE OF THE ARMED FORCES IS OVER

The reduction in force of the Armed Forces proceeded in several stages. At the first stage (1992-1996), the strength of the Armed Forces was reduced from 2.75 to 1.6 million. At present the second stage of reductions is almost over. As of August 1, 2003, the strength of the Armed Forces equals 1.16 million and will be further reduced to approximately 1 million by 2005.

The number of officers is a special question. It is believed in society that there are tens of thousands of generals in the Russian Armed Forces. This is not
true. The balance of military posts filled with senior officers and the overall strength of the Armed Forces equals 0.1%, which is less than in the Soviet or tsarist armies, or the modern armies of most other countries. Moreover, this share is the lowest compared to the officer-man ratio in other departments where military service is stipulated by law: 0.44% in the Emergencies Ministry, and 0.13% in the Federal Security Service (including the Federal Frontier Service).

The reduction of the Armed Forces was a painful process, largely because of the scale of reductions and the economic crisis that raged in the country. This is why a separate item was added to the federal budget of Russia, Military Reform, designed for financing the projects of power ministries and departments within the framework of the military reform. Allocations were made for the following purposes:

- the issue of monetary remuneration and compensation payments to servicemen demobilised from military service in connection with the military reform, and to members of their families;
- the provision of housing to servicemen demobilised from military service in connection with the military reform (these expenses top 70% of the aggregate spending under this item);
- the provision of transportation within the framework of the state defence order (relocation expenses to the chosen place of residence, and so on);
- maintenance, exploitation and routine repairs of weapons, military hardware and property within the programmes of the military reform.

In 2002, a total of 16.5 billion roubles were allocated on the military reform under this item, including 14.9 billion roubles to the Defence Ministry. In 2003, 15.8 billion roubles are to be allocated, with 14.3 billion roubles going to the Defence Ministry.
In other words, the peak of expenses on the military reform is past.

Despite difficulties, the Russian Armed Forces have preserved the core of the officers’ corps and the best combat ready units. They have become more compact without lowering their combat capability. No more major reductions in force are stipulated for the Armed Forces, whose strength has been brought to the level of defence sufficiency.

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICY HAS BEEN ADJUSTED TO NEW GLOBAL REALITIES

The reform of the Armed Forces and the military organisation of Russia and the elaboration of new principles of Russia’s military policy took into account the new level of political relations with the USA and other industrialised countries. Some fundamental principles of military planning have been revised. In particular, a global nuclear war and large-scale conventional wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions have been excluded from the list of probable armed conflicts for which the Russian Armed Forces prepared. This allowed us to scale down the nuclear and conventional arsenals without detriment to national security. A spotlight in the training of troops (forces) was put, alongside traditional forms of warfare, to peacekeeping, special and counter-terrorist operations, participation in local conflicts, and the like.
CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OF MANNING OF THE ARMED FORCES

The following measures were taken in the process of improving the system of manning of the Armed Forces:

1. **Control over the system of manning the Armed Forces with privates and sergeants has been centralised.** Conditions have been created for the reform of recruitment agencies of the services of the Armed Forces and their functions have been turned over to the Main Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate of the General Staff.

2. **The preparation of citizens for military service in educational establishments, public associations and training centres of organisations is to be improved.** The need to improve the preparation of citizens for military service is growing objectively in conditions of the reform of the Armed Forces and gradual transition to manning them with contract servicemen. The growth in the number of training centres of organisations will involve all young men aged 16 and 17 in military training and allow us to gradually accumulate a reserve for the manning of troops (forces).

3. **The procedure for recruiting privates and sergeants has been changed. The practice of recruiting contract servicemen to the Armed Forces has been expanded.** The programme of partial transition of privates and sergeants to contract service, approved by President Vladimir Putin, fits the current financial and economic possibilities of the country. The introduction of contract service will not rule out service conscription but its length will be gradually reduced. This programme is seen as a means of raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

   It should be said that contract servicemen amount to slightly more than 55% of the strength of the Armed Forces (about 12% of them are sergeants and privates) but this figure is to increase to nearly 70% by 2008, when the Federal Target Programme is to be implemented. The number of contract sergeants will top 50.7%.
THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERN SYSTEM OF SOCIAL INSURANCE OF SERVICEMEN

Despite serious difficulties, especially in the first half of the 1990s, the Defence Ministry, acting jointly with other departments, has launched several programmes that have considerably improved the social situation of officers, sergeants and privates. In addition to rises in the monetary remuneration of servicemen, wage arrears to officers and military pensioners have been repaid. Government Resolution No. 71 of January 20, 1998 enacted the Federal Target Programme of State Housing Certificates, whose main goal is to ensure the early provision of housing to the families of servicemen who have retired or are retiring from military service.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SYSTEM OF INTERACTION WITH OTHER POWER DEPARTMENTS OF RUSSIA WHERE THE ARMED FORCES ARE THE CENTRAL PART OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF RUSSIA

The implementation of the basic provisions of the military reform turned the Armed Forces of Russia into the core of the military organisation of the state. In accordance with Law No. 61-FZ "On Defence" adopted on May 31, 1996, the Armed Forces of Russia are the basic power structure of the state responsible for the security of the country and protection of its national interests. Under the Federal Constitutional Law "On the State of Emergency," the Russian Armed Forces can be used, by decision of the President, in internal armed conflicts to cut short the operation of illegal
armed formations, restore law and order, and ensure public safety and stability. The Armed Forces of Russia can be used to provide assistance to bodies of state power, local self-governments and population in clearing up the consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SYSTEM OF MILITARY-POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS OF RUSSIA TO ITS ALLIES GEARED TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

The development of a system of allied ties of Russia with other states was launched immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and has continued since then. The contents of this process was the gearing of Russia’s military-political obligations to the principles of international law and sovereign foreign policy interests of Russia and its military-political partners. At present this co-operation is based on mutual respect for sovereignty and transparency of all basic military-political obligations. The international obligations of the Russian Federation are stipulated in the following documents:

- the UN Charter and the decision of the UN Security Council, confirmed by the President and the Federal Assembly of Russia, on the dispatch of troops for peacekeeping operations within the framework of UN actions;
- the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS countries signed on May 15, 1992, ratified in April 1994, prolonged for five years and ratified in 1999, which served as the basis for creating the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which is the foundation for the implementation of Russia’s allied obligations to the CIS countries;
other agreements that cover different aspects of the coordination of military activities of the CIS countries, which serve as the basis for the operation of the Staff for Coordinating the Military Cooperation of the CIS Countries, in particular the December 24, 1993 Decision of the Council of the CIS Heads of State (Ashkhabad) on the approval of the Regulations on the Staff for Co-ordinating the Military Cooperation of the CIS Countries;


THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PARTNER RELATIONS WITH THE USA AND NATO AT THE LEVEL OF THE ARMED FORCES

Partner relations with the USA and NATO at the level of the Armed Forces, which correspond to the new standards of political relations, paved the
way to the creation of additional structures and institutions for the maintenance of global stability. Russia’s partner relations with NATO are maintained despite major differences on issues pertaining to the eastward enlargement of the bloc and its military operation in the zones of armed conflicts. The creation of the Russia-NATO Council in accordance with the decisions of the Rome meeting of Russia and NATO in May 2002 was a priority project of Russia’s interaction with the USA and NATO. The operation of the Council allowed a more comprehensive development of the system of Russia-NATO contacts and consultations in crisis situations and the procedure for creating joint military contingents in conflict zones.

Operating within the framework of Russia-NATO contacts are a number of working groups in the following areas:

- the air space;
- logistics and material-technical supplies;
- and
- ballistic missile defence.

On February 8, 2003 Defence Minister of Russia Sergei Ivanov and NATO Secretary General George Robertson signed a framework Russia-NATO agreement on the rescue of submarine crews.

Today we not only take part in joint exercises but also hold joint peacekeeping operations. Long-term military-technical cooperation with concerned NATO countries, which provides for the joint creation of military items, has become a fact of life. We are working to raise the standards of operational compatibility of the units of the Armed Forces of Russia and NATO troops, which is an obligatory condition for the successful implementation of joint operations.

Despite considerable objective and subjective difficulties in the implementation of the military reform, we have ensured sufficient control of the processes and maintained the combat ability of the Armed Forces. It was largely conducive to a serious strengthening of the international role and status of Russia in the early 21st century and to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country.

It can be said, on the whole, that the large-scale changes in the Armed Forces, concerned with the radical revision within the framework of the basic provisions of the military reform, have been implemented. We are facing the next stage now: we must start creating modern armed forces based on the legal, political, organisational-structural conditions created in the process of the reform, proceeding from the revised understanding of national interests, the place of Russia in the world, and the scale of threats to national security.
II. RUSSIA IN THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY-POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE WORLD TODAY

The understanding of Russia’s basic national interests and of the main instruments of meeting these interests is closely associated with Russia’s place in the present system of global military-political relations. The military-political situation in the world today is characterized by a combination of two main tendencies. On the one hand, there is a striving to form a new, more democratic and fair system of international economic and political relations. On the other, there is a growing practice of using armed force on the basis of national decisions ignoring a UN mandate. Parallel with these relatively new tendencies, cold war stereotypes continue to exist, considerably aggravating the international situation.

In these conditions armed force as an instrument of foreign policy and a means of protecting the national interests of one or another state has retained its significance.

Russia has been coming out consistently for creating a system of international relations in which the significance of armed force would be reduced to a minimum and its functions would be confined to containing armed conflicts. However, considering the objectively existing tendencies in the system of international relations, Russia has to correct its vision of the role of its military policy and its military instruments. Modern and effective armed forces in Russia become one of the main conditions for its successful and painless integration into the emerging system of international relations.

Russia’s extrication from the political and economic crisis, which began at the start of this century, and a considerable strengthening of its positions in the world arena has been a major world tendency of late. This allows one to speak about the need to formulate new priorities in its foreign policy, taking into account new realities, and about objective geopolitical requirements of the Russian Federation associated with the need to provide favorable conditions for its development as one of the leading states of the world.

New global tendencies are acquiring considerable significance for understanding the specifics of Russia’s foreign-policy interests and therefore the role of the Russian Armed Forces.

First, counteraction to new challenges stimulated by the globalization processes come to the foreground in the global system of military-political relations. Among these challenges are proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of their delivery, international terrorism, ethnic instability, activities of radical religious associations and groups, drug trafficking and organized crime. The character of these challenges does not allow combating them effectively by the efforts of separate states. Therefore, the importance of international
cooperation among power agencies, including security services and armed forces, is greatly increasing.

**Second,** international operations with the use of force outside traditional military-political organizations are becoming a reality. Armed force is used increasingly by temporarily formed coalitions. Such practice will probably be used more often in the future. This reflects the objective character of the present situation in the world. However, Russia stands for strict observance of the norms of international law in forming such coalitions, especially if the use of armed force is involved, and it will join such coalitions only if it is in its foreign-policy interests.

**Third,** economic interests are increasingly moving to the fore in foreign-policy priorities of states. These interests are becoming more important than political and military-political ones. Moreover, the economic interests of individual states more and more often converge with the interests of big monopolies. As a result, the understanding of conditions sufficient for the use of armed force has changed considerably. In the past direct military threat to the security or interests of a state most often was enough for taking a decision to use armed force, whereas now armed force is increasingly used for protecting the economic interests of a country. This objectively enlarges the sphere of foreign-policy requirements for the use of armed force.

**Fourth,** national and international terrorism has been merging. Today, when an international anti-terrorist association has become a reality, there is no sense in trying to divide terrorist activities into domestic and international ones. This refers to both a political approach to curbing terrorist activities and the use of force in neutralizing such activities. It is obvious that terrorism has turned from a political threat into a military-political one, and the sphere of responsibility of armed forces, in particular the Armed Forces of Russia, to counter it, has greatly expanded.

**Fifth,** the significance of non-state participants in the system of international relations for determining foreign-policy priorities of various states has increased substantially. Non-government organizations, international movements and communities, inter-state organizations and informal clubs exert a great, and sometimes contradictory, influence on a policy pursued by some states. Russia seeks active participation in the main inter-state and international organizations to meet various aspects of its foreign-policy and security interests.

These tendencies greatly complement, and sometimes change, the processes developing in bilateral political relations as well as in traditional inter-state organizations.

The most important aspect determining an approach to building up and developing Russia’s military capability is the understanding of the character of our country’s relations with the most signi-
significant elements of the modern system of international relations.

UNITED NATIONS AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Russia regards the United Nations and its Security Council as a central element ensuring global stability. Reducing the role of the UN Security Council and going over to the use of armed force on the basis of decisions taken on a national level is seen as a dangerous tendency, capable in future of presenting a grave threat to Russia’s political and military-political interests. This may greatly diminish the significance and effectiveness of political instruments of crisis management and lower considerably the threshold of the use of armed force.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION

Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are most important in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia will keep on developing the potential of coordinating military-political activities of the CIS countries in the framework of the existing structures and institutions. The Collective Security Treaty of the CIS countries determines the structure of Russia’s mili-
tary-political obligations to its allies. Russia will continue to work for turning the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) into an effective inter-state organization having a stabilizing effect on the general military-political situation in the CIS and in the regions bordering on it. Russia regards security and inviolability of the borders of the CSTO member countries as a priority in its military planning.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND EUROPEAN UNION

Russia’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are determined by the 2001 Rome Declaration. Russia watches closely the transformation of NATO and expects that the direct and indirect elements of an anti-Russian character will be completely removed from both the military planning and political declarations of the NATO member states. However, if NATO is preserved as a military alliance with its present-day offensive doctrine, this will require cardinal amendment of Russia’s military planning and the principles of developing the Russian Armed Forces, including changes in the nuclear strategy of the country. Russia also expects that constructive political and economic relations with the countries of the European Union will develop further, proceeding from the need to establish mutually beneficial, fair and non-discriminating relations and also to recognize unconditionally the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and respect its right to combat all manifestations of international terrorism.

RUSSIA-U.S. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Russia expects cooperation with the United States to grow in political, military-political and economic spheres as well as in ensuring stability and dismantling the Cold War vestiges. It also expects constructive interaction with the U.S. in ensuring regional stability and non-
proliferation of mass destruction weapons on a regional level. Russia supports the efforts in the struggle against international terrorism in the framework of the anti-terrorist coalition, which is an element of global stability and a means of establishing a more just new world order. In its relations with the U.S. Russia proceeds from the need to strictly observe international law and from the primacy of its own national interests. Despite some differences in the approach to solving regional problems, Russia believes a consensus should be found on the basis of observance of international law and mutual respect for the national interests of each other.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has a major role to play in maintaining regional stability in Central Asia and the Far East. If the political and military-political potential of the SCO keeps growing, a zone of peace and stability in the South-Eastern and Far Eastern areas will be established, ruling out the emergence of a large-scale military threat. But if complete or partial renationalization of the policy occurs as regards security of the states in the region, Russia will be compelled to consider the region as a potential source of ethnic conflicts, border disputes and general military-political instability.

Thus, the analysis of the current global political tendencies shows that the present international situation, marked by dynamic and variegated processes and by the evolution of a number of key international institutions, poses the task of assessing the system of threats to the security of the Russian Federation in a new, comprehensive and realistic way, and on that basis to determine priorities in its foreign policy and military development in keeping with Russia’s new international status and its available resources.
III. THREAT ASSESSMENT

The point of departure in assessing the level of military threat to Russia is the fact that the importance of military power in the system of international relations has not diminished lately. Moreover, the military-political situation does not rule out the possibility of major armed conflicts close to Russia’s borders bearing on the security interests of Russia, or a direct military threat to the security of Russia.

Each state has permanent basic national interests, such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, socio-political stability, constitutional regime, strategic stability in the system of international community, free access to vital economic-strategic zones and communications, etc.

National, including basic interests can be influenced by a wide range of threats provoked by changes in the military-political situation, which can take political, military-political and military forms. There are three types of threats in the current international situation, whose neutralisation is the function, to one degree or another, of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: external, internal and transborder threats.

The main external threats include:

- territorial claims to Russia; the threat of political or military seizure of parts of Russian territory;
- programmes of creating weapons of mass destruction carried out by states, organisations and movements;
- interference in the internal affairs of Russia by foreign states or organisations supported by foreign states;
- demonstration of military power close to Russia’s border; military exercises with provocative aims;
- seats of armed conflicts close to the borders of Russia or its allies, which threaten their security;
- instability, weakness of state institutes in border countries;
- the build-up of groups of forces resulting in the disruption of the balance of forces close to the borders of Russia or its allies and adjacent seas;
- the expansion of military blocs and unions to the detriment of the military security of Russia or its allies;
- the operation of international radical groups, the strengthening of Islamic extremism close to Russia’s borders;
- the deployment of foreign troops (without agreement with Russia and the UN Security Council sanction) in the territory of adjacent and friendly countries;
- armed provocations, including attacks at the military facilities of Russia located in foreign
states, as well as the facilities and structures on the state border of Russia or the borders of its allies;

- actions hindering the operation of the Russian systems of state and military management, of the strategic nuclear forces, early warning systems, ballistic missile defence, space control and combat stability of troops;
- actions hindering Russia’s access to strategic transport communications;
- discrimination against and infringement on the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the citizens of Russia in foreign states;
- proliferation of equipment, technologies and component parts used for the creation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as dual technologies that can be used for the creation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

The main internal threats include:

- use of force in an attempt to change the constitutional regime and violate the territorial integrity of Russia;
- planning, preparation and execution of actions to disrupt and disorganise the operation of bodies of state power and management, attacks at state, economic, military and life support facilities and information infrastructure;
- creation, arming, training and operation of illegal armed formations;
- illegal circulation of weapons, munitions, explosive materials, and so on in the Russian Federation;
- large-scale operation of organised crime threatening political stability at the scale of a member of the Federation;
- the operation of separatist and radical religious-nationalist movements in Russia.

The transborder threats are political, military-political and military threats to the interests and security of Russia, which combine elements of external and internal threats and, being internal in form, are actually external in essence (in terms of source of origin and encouragement, possible participants, and the like). The importance of transborder threats for the security of Russia and the Russian military planning will grow. These threats include:

- the creation, arming, maintenance and training of armed formations and groups in other states with the purpose of dispatching them to the territory of Russia or its allies;
- the operation of subversive separatist, national or religious extremist groups (supported directly or indirectly by foreign sources) designed to undermine the constitutional regime of Russia,
threaten the territorial integrity of Russia and the safety of its citizens;
➤ transborder crime, including smuggling and other illegal activities at the scale that threatens the military-political security of Russia or stability of its allies;
➤ information (information-technical, information-psychological, and other) actions hostile to Russia and its allies;
➤ the operation of international terrorist organisations;
➤ drug trafficking to or via the territory of Russia as a transit territory for further transportation of drugs to other countries.

The neutralisation of external threats, as well as involvement in the neutralisation of internal and transborder threats is the task of the Armed Forces fulfilled jointly with other security agencies and related agencies of Russia’s allies.

Actions to cut short such threats shall be taken with due regard for the provisions of international and humanitarian law, proceeding from the supremacy of national security interests of Russia and Russian law. As of now, the level of military threat to Russia’s security is relatively low. None of the existing conflict situations involving the use of military power is creating a direct military threat to Russia’s security. At the same time, changes in the geopolitical situation prompt the conclusion that political instruments (membership of international organisations, partner relations, and possible influence) are not sufficient for ensuring the security of Russia.

Russian military planning in the area of the development and use of the Armed Forces in the first half of the 21st century will also depend on a number of uncertainty factors. An uncertainty factor is a situation, conflict or political and
military-political processes whose development can seriously change the geopolitical situation in the region of priority interests to Russia or create a direct security threat to Russia. However, the nature of uncertainty factors precludes the elaboration of unequivocal forecasts of their development. This turns uncertainty factors into a special category of military planning for the Russian Armed Forces.

The most important uncertainty factors for Russian military planning are:

**DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL SITUATION IN KEY COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD**

Today the main countries of the world are acting in conditions of relative transparency of foreign policy and military-political planning, ensured by the existence and development of democratic institutions, parliamentarism and civil society. The transparency of foreign policy and its civilised nature ensure the probability of long-term partnership of Russia and the world’s most industrialised countries, including in the military-political sphere. Changes in the situation, in particular the decision of the national leadership of these states to abandon individual elements of democracy and the principle of maximum predictability of foreign policy decisions and their compliance with the principles of international law, will force Russia to review the political nature of relations with these states and, in the future, to change individual elements of its military policy.

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE CIS COUNTRIES**

Russia wholeheartedly supports the development of democracy in the CIS countries and the creation of harmonious polyethnic societies in them, with the rights of Russian citizens and ethnic Russians respected and protected. Internal instability for ethnic or political reasons in any of the CIS countries and actions taken by a political regime to curtail democratic changes may force Russia to amend its principles of military planning.

**SITUATION IN THE REGIONS BORDERING ON THE CIS**

Today the situation in the bulk of regions adjacent to the CIS is favourable for the security of Russia. But the development of major internal or interstate tensions may call for seriously changing the deployment of the groups of forces of the Defence Ministry and other power departments. The most alarming is the situation in Afghanistan and adjacent regions of Central Asia. Despite the absence of a direct military
threat, Russia still regards that direction as potentially dangerous. There is a persisting threat of drug trafficking from Afghanistan via Central Asian states to Russia. Destabilisation of the situation in Afghanistan and the possibility of the revival of the threat of Islamic extremism from that direction will face the Russian Armed Forces with new military-political and military tasks and call for changing the current group of forces and resources in the Southern Strategic Direction.

**THE POSSIBILITY OF REASSIGNING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

There have been attempts to reassign the characteristics of permissible instruments of war to nuclear weapons by implementing "breakthrough" technical research projects of making nuclear weapons relatively "clean" in terms of the consequences of their use. On the other hand, the growing practice of the use of military power without sanctions of the UN Security Council can encourage greater demand for weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear ones, in regional powers that are seeking to create an instrument of guaranteed deterrence against possible hostile actions on the part of industrialised countries. The Russian Defence Ministry views the existence of such R&D projects in some countries and the adoption of political decisions on putting greater stress on them as a factor that can undermine global and regional stability. The lowering of the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons will force Russia to overhaul its system of troop control and attitudes to the deterrence of threats of different size.

Even a cursory analysis of existing threats to the national security of Russia, with due regard for uncertainty factors, reveals the level of changes in the world in the past ten years. It is apparent that changes in the military-political forms and methods were accompanied by major transformations in the nature of the direct military, combat confrontation, which should be taken into account during the assessment of military development prospects in Russia.
IV. MODERN WARFARE AND ARMED CONFLICTS

The level of threats and factors of uncertainty exercises a substantial influence on the military-political and military-strategic situation in the world, on creation of seats of tension and conflict areas, and on the nature of wars and armed conflicts in general. It ought to be said that wars and armed conflicts of the future will be caused not only by one factor, however significant, but by a combination of complex inter-connected socio-political, economic, national and religious contradictions and causes, which should be borne in mind when examining the strategic implications of the armed struggle of the future.

The most noteworthy wars and armed conflicts of the past decade are given in Table 1.

Speaking of the specifics of armed conflicts of the 90s and the beginning of the 21st century, their following fundamental aspects can be singled out:

➤ no uniform pattern has emerged in the types of armed conflicts. All of them, in form and principles of warfare, were different:
  ➤ a considerable part of the conflicts were asymmetrical, that is, occurred between opponents at different stages of technical development and with different qualitative status of their armed forces;
  ➤ all conflicts developed within relatively limited territory, inside one theatre of operations, but involved forces and equipment deployed outside their scenes. However, local conflicts were fought with great intensity and in a number of cases led to total collapse of the state system (if any) of one of the parties to the conflict;
  ➤ a much greater role was played by the initial period of an armed conflict or war. An analysis of the outcome of armed conflicts showed that when initiative was seized in the initial phase of operations this pre-determined their outcome;
  ➤ the principal role in the initial stages of war was undoubtedly played by long-range high-precision weapons combined with aviation. But the further brunt of warfare was borne by land forces.

This sets before the Russian Armed Forces the task of being ready to take part in a conflict of any known type. And this in turn is possible only when all key specifics of modern wars and armed conflicts are understood. As applied to the goals of the Russian Armed Forces, it is necessary to note the growing significance of the difference between potential conflicts on the different strategic sectors.

The basic distinction of the conflicts of the recent historical period has been the redistribution of the roles of the different spheres in armed confrontation: the course and outcome of armed struggle as a whole will now be determined mainly by confrontation in air and outer space and at sea, while ground forces will only consolidate the military success achieved and directly ensure the attainment of political goals.

This highlights the greater interdependence and interconnection of strategic, theatre and tactical operations in armed struggle. Actually, it points to
the fact that the former concept of conventional wars, both limited and large-scale, is undergoing a sea change. Even local conflicts can be carried out over relatively wide areas with most far-reaching objectives. And the main goals will be sought not in the course of clashes between advance units, but through fire effect at maximum range.

Speaking of the nuclear deterrence factor, especially when applied to containing threats posed by an opponent using conventional arms, one must bear in mind that in present-day conditions the nuclear deterrence can be effective only given highly-equipped and combat-ready general-purpose forces. It is only in this case that the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack involving conventional armed forces will look convincing.

An analysis of the most common features of conflicts of the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century suggests the following general conclusions concerning the military-political features of armed struggle at the current stage and for the foreseeable future.

◆ Armed forces have confirmed their central role in carrying out operations involving force. The fighting role of irregular, para-military formations, militias and internal security units has proved much weaker than was expected before the beginning of armed conflicts. They proved incapable of fighting actively against a regular army (Iraq).

◆ The decisive moment for achieving military-political success is the capture of strategic initiative in the course of an armed conflict. Passive opera-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Changes in the Nature of Warfare</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At the end of the 20th century</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Geographic zones of operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Conventional and high-precision ammunition</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Pre-deployment of troops (forces) on main sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Close-in contact fighting, direct engagement of sides</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Physical protection</td>
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<td>6. Large inventory of weapons and military equipment and logistic supplies</td>
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<td>8. Predominantly separate strike and defence systems</td>
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LEGEND

AA - army aviation
AD - air defence
ADMT - air defence missile troops
AMD - anti-missile defence
AMDR - anti-missile defence radar
ASA - assault aviation
AWACS - air-borne warning and control
BA - bomber aviation
FA - fighter aviation
FIASCSR - Federal Intelligence and Air Space Control Service radar
GF - ground forces
LRA - long-range aviation
MTA - military transport aviation
N - navy
OTH - OTH radar
SC - spacecraft
SD - space defence
SMFL - Strategic Missile Force launchers
tions in anticipation of the opponent’s offensive drive petering out will result in the loss of control of one’s own grouping and later in the defeat in the conflict.

◆ The specifics of armed struggle of the future will be that in the course of war, the opponent’s blows will be aimed not only at military targets and troops, but also at the country’s economy with its infrastructure, civilian population and territory. Despite the high precision of weaponry, all recent armed conflicts analysed have been in one way or another “dirty” from the humanitarian viewpoint and entailed considerable casualties among civilian population. This necessitates a well-organised and highly efficient system of national civil defence.

◆ Criteria for military victory in armed conflicts will be different, but on the whole it is apparent that solution of political problems is of paramount significance in an armed conflict, while military-political and operational-tactical tasks are mostly of an ancillary nature. In none of the conflicts examined the winning side could inflict planned damage on the opponent. But it still was able to reach the political objectives of the conflict.

◆ Despite the increased role of manpower and equipment deployed by the moment of the threatened period, a considerable role in the outcome of an armed conflict will be played by the availability of a combat-ready reserve and a system for its mobilisation and deployment. This will keep intact the strategic resource for military reaction whatever the development of the situation in the course of an armed conflict.

◆ Combat action will be characterised by a combination of maneuvering operations and positional warfare. Reconnaissance and sabotage and guerilla warfare are viewed as part of an “ordinary” war. This confirms the need for a balanced composition of manpower and equipment of the armed forces, and also for comprehensive combat training.

◆ Of decisive significance for the defending side will be an efficient intelligence system incorporating one control centre and well-protected points for collection and analysis of intelligence from all fighting services and secret services, and capable of submitting processed intelligence data to all quarters concerned within the shortest time possible, almost in real time. The existence of such an intelligence system will help timely to expose the opponent’s plans for attack, carry out all required measures in the threatened period and, above all, to put troops on the highest operational alert.

◆ A group of troops, apart from conventional elements required by the tactical order of battle (battle formation), should comprise: an intelligence and information centre acting in real time; an automated and highly protected troop and arms command and control system; an air space echelon (or part of it) of high precision weapons; and a highly protected reserve.
The character of modern weaponry necessitates manpower and equipment that can strike at the opponent’s military assets (long-range high-precision arms, and long-range aviation) situated beyond the boundaries of the actual scene of conflict. This calls for both one’s own long-range high-precision arms potential, and for other assets making it possible to move military action directly into the opponent’s territory.

Special attention should be paid to an efficient duplication of troop (forces) command at all echelons of command. To these ends it is necessary to exploit all existing communications systems and to create new ones, make maximum use of air command posts and to ensure that orders from the country’s top leadership reach the commanders and are fulfilled.

A key condition for victory practically in all conflicts is undermining the morale of troops and inflaming ferment in the officer corps. A substantial role in the armed conflicts at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century will be played by a ratio between moral and psychological stability levels of the sides and especially among top command personnel. This signifies the need for military discipline, legality, a truly efficient system of moral and psychological conditioning of the armed forces from private to general, and enhanced efficiency of military counter-intelligence bodies. Of much importance for the outcome of armed conflicts will be facilities for conducting information and propaganda work among troops and population of the opponent.

In view of the above trends, new aspects are emerging in the existing principles of warcraft, which can be summarised as follows:

FIRST.

The principle of concentrating manpower and equipment in the decisive sector, which has existed since olden times, needs updating in the altered conditions. It should be applied not to concentrating troops in a selected sector, but chiefly via massive employment of fire weapons. The mode of their application will change. New long-range arms will in a number of cases dispense with troop manoeuvre and concentration and will manoeuvre instead with trajectories to deliver massive fire strikes at certain troop groupings. Meanwhile, strike forces can advance to the chosen sectors of main blows at the very last moment.

SECOND.

There will be a changed balance of strategy, major tactics and tactics, although all these categories of warcraft will retain their significance. In any case, exploiting strategic strikes and completing the defeat of opponent groupings will depend on the success of theatre and tactical operations.

THIRD.

Substantial changes are expected in external and internal aspects of armed struggle. The princi-
pal changes are dictated by its intrinsic content, which will rigidly combine the operations of a large number of fighting services, fighting arms, and special troops performing a vast number of highly complicated and inter-connected strategic, theatre and tactical tasks simultaneously in all spheres of armed struggle. The main objectives of defeating and routing the opponent will be decided not by large masses of infantry and tanks clashing with each other, but mainly via long-range fire engagement.

FOURTH.

Methods used by troops in offence and defence will grow increasingly similar. The offensive of the future is visualized as a combination of fire and radio electronic effects. The increased range and efficiency of weapons will necessitate more detailed rules for decentralizing troops frontally and in depth, both in offence and defence, and removal of fire lines from waiting areas, troop deployment lines and second eche- lons and reserves. A greater role will be played by sufficiently strong and well-protected ground troop groupings and forces set up in advance and capable not only of repulsing an enemy attack in the wake of massive air strikes, but also of being ready for the immediate mounting (possibly by separate autonomous detachments or groups) of offensive operations in direct contact with the aggressor’s or its allies’ ground troops. At the very first stage, in the initial period of war, it is necessary to turn "non-contact" warfare into "contact" fighting as the least desirable by an opponent equipped with long-range high-precision weapons. Special significance is attached to prompt disablement of the opponent’s infrastructure concerned with political and economic management, and its systems of communication and electronic countermeasures.

FIFTH.

A distinctive feature of future tactical operations will be the growing significance of the range of effective fire. Troops will be able to inflict considerable losses on the opponent long before coming in direct contact with it. New weapons will ensure a continuity of the offensive, suddenness and swiftness of blows, and high activity, manoeuvrability and sustainability of troops. One of the characteristic features of fighting will be frustration and repulsion of the opponent’s air strikes and the effort to gain supremacy in the air.

SIXTH.

Special consideration is given to the ability of troops to ensure a speedy knocking out of the opponent’s infrastructure of political and economic administration, as well as its systems of communications and electronic countermeasures.

SEVENTH.

A decisive role in warfare of the future will be played by a well-protected air defence system
immune to jamming and able to deal with all the opponent's aircraft, including those manufactured by the Stealth technology. The air defence system must be stretched in depth and have three structural levels:

➤ strategic AD with elements to safeguard against cruise and ballistic missiles;
➤ point AD covering the most significant military, political and humanitarian elements of the infrastructure;
➤ AD of ground forces to neutralise the opponent’s attempts to gain supremacy in the air over the battlefield.

EIGHTH.

In planning aggression, the opponent will carry out a wide spectrum of activities to conceal the beginning and nature of its preparations for the attack. One of the effective ways of solving this problem may be a special misinformation campaign including a set of interconnected and well coordinated measures to mislead the opposing side concerning the doer’s actual intentions.

NINTH.

Although gaining air supremacy and massive application of precision weapons are decisive in determining the outcome of armed struggle, they do not dispense with massive ground operations mounted by land forces. Extensive dependence on air support will be a factor restricting the combat use of armed forces. AD assets have been found to have increased significance on the battlefield.

But an analysis of the above-listed features of wars typical of the newly arrived era shows at the same time that this is not a classic example of "non-contact" war, but rather an intermediate (transitional) version featuring the traits of both traditional wars and the specifics of wars of a new generation that have come to be known as "non-contact wars". For now the concept of "non-contact war" remains only a theoretical model reflecting the desire of certain states to de-escalate their involvement in regional conflicts marked by a presence of ground troops. No doubt, it is hardly possible to make combat operations totally non-contact. That would probably entail forming coalitions within which one of the partners would bear the brunt of ground war. But that would be at considerable political costs.

The specifics of modern wars and armed conflicts so ascertained set the goal of formulating a new understanding of the basic tasks facing the Armed Forces of Russia. These tasks should take into account both the apparent specifics of the military-political situation in Russia's areas of interest and the character of armed struggle, and possible development of the principles of combat operations with due account for changes in the geopolitical situation and advanced means of warfare.
V. THE TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The foreign policy situation, which has changed in the past few years, new priorities in ensuring national security have set to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation completely different tasks, which can be classified into four main categories:

1. Containment of military and military-political threats to the security or interests of the Russian Federation.
2. Ensuring the economic and political interests of the Russian Federation.
3. Carrying out peacetime military operations.
4. The use of armed force.

The specific features of the development of the military-political situation in the world determine the possibility of the evolution of the performance of one task into another task because the military-political situations that are more problematic from the viewpoint of the security of the Russian Federation are of a comprehensive and multifaceted nature.

CONTAINMENT OF MILITARY AND MILITARY-POLITICAL THREATS TO THE SECURITY OR INTERESTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IS ENSURED BY:

- timely identification of the threatening development of the military-political situation, preparation of an armed attack against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
- maintenance of the structure, state, combat and mobilisation readiness and the training of strategic nuclear forces, manpower and facilities ensuring their operational maintenance and employment, as well as the control systems at the level guaranteeing the infliction of the set damage to the aggressor in any conditions;
- maintenance of the combat potential, combat and mobilisation readiness and the training of the peacetime general-purpose groups of troops (forces) at the level ensuring the repulsion of a local-scale aggression;
- maintenance of readiness for strategic deployment within the framework of state measures to put the nation on a wartime footing;
- organisation of territorial defence.

ENSURING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING COMPONENTS:

- ensuring the security of Russian citizens in the zones of armed conflicts and political or other forms of instability;
- creating conditions for the security of the economic activity of the Russian Federation and the economic structures representing it;
- upholding the national interests of the Russian Federation in territorial waters, on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, as well as in the world’s oceans;
- conducting, by decision of the President of the Russian Federation, operations with the use of
the forces and means of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the set scale in the regions of vital economic and political interests of the Russian Federation;

➤ organising and waging information warfare.

CARRYING OUT PEACETIME MILITARY OPERATIONS:

● fulfilment by the Russian Federation of allied obligations under international treaties or other interstate agreements;
● struggle against international terrorism, political extremism and separatism, prevention of subversive and terrorist acts;
● partial or full strategic deployment, maintenance of readiness for and the use of the nuclear deterrence potential;
● participation in peacekeeping operations in keeping with the mandate of the UN or the CIS under the peacekeeping or peace enforcement scenarios as part of coalitions created within the framework of international organisations of which Russia is a permanent or temporary member;
● ensuring the regime of martial law (a state of emergency) in one or several members of the Russian Federation in accordance with the decisions of the supreme bodies of state authority;
● protection of the State Border of the Russian Federation in air space and under water;
● enforcement of the regime of international sanctions imposed on the basis of resolutions of the UN Security Council;
● prevention of ecological catastrophes and other emergencies, elimination of their consequences.

Deployment of Russian Peacekeeping Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nos</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Basic aims</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Since 2000</td>
<td>Air support of the UN mission, air escort and protection of UN troops and humanitarian conveyors</td>
<td>Up to 115 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Transdniestria</td>
<td>Since 1992</td>
<td>Monitoring observance of truce terms and helping to maintain law and order in the region</td>
<td>Up to 500 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>South Ossetia</td>
<td>Since 1992</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire, pullout of armed units, disbandment of self-defence forces, and security in the control area</td>
<td>Up to 500 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
<td>Since 1994</td>
<td>Blocking the conflict area, monitoring troop pullout and disarmament, guarding key facilities and communications, escorting humanitarian cargoes</td>
<td>Up to 2,000 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USE OF ARMED FORCES TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation prepare for direct participation in the following types of armed conflicts:

**ARMED CONFLICT**

This is one of the forms of settling political, ethnic, religious, territorial and other disputes by means of armed struggle where the state (states) taking part in combat actions does not pass into a special state called war. In an armed conflict, the sides pursue their own military-political aims, as a rule.

An armed conflict may be a consequence of the escalation of an armed incident, a border conflict, an act of war and other armed clashes of a limited scale during which the means of armed struggle are used to settle differences.

An armed conflict may be international (with the participation of two or more states) or internal (with the armed struggle being conducted within the borders of one state).

**LOCAL WAR**

This is a war between two or more states with limited political objectives, where combat actions are
conducted within the borders of the conflicting states, as a rule, and where mostly the interests (territorial, economic, political and other) of only these states are involved.

A local war may be waged by groups of troops (forces) deployed in the area of conflict, with their potential reinforcement with additional forces and means transferred from other directions and a partial strategic deployment of armed forces.

Under certain conditions, local wars may escalate into a regional or a large-scale war.

REGIONAL WAR

This is a war involving two or more states (groups of states) of a region waged by the national or coalition armed forces with the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons in a territory limited to one region with the adjacent water bodies of oceans, seas, air space and outer space, during which the sides pursue important military-political aims. Waging a regional war requires full deployment of the armed forces, mobilisation of the economies and maximal efforts of the embattled states. When states that possess nuclear weapons or their allies take part in a regional war, it will be fraught with the use of nuclear weapons.

LARGE-SCALE WAR

This is a war between the coalitions of states or major states of the world community. It may be a result of the escalation of an armed conflict, a local or regional war through the involvement in it of a considerable number of states in various regions of the world. In a large-scale war, the sides pursue radical military-political aims. It requires the mobilisation of all the available material and moral resources of the states involved.
Modern Russian military planning, based on a realistic assessment of the available resources and capabilities of the Russian Federation, proceeds from the premise that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, together with other troops, must be prepared to repulse an attack and defeat an aggressor, take active actions (both defensive and offensive) under any scenario of the outbreak and development of wars and armed conflicts, in the conditions of massive use by the enemy of modern and prospective combat means of destruction, including all types of weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must be able:

➤ in peacetime and in emergencies, while preserving the strategic deterrence potential and fulfilling the tasks of maintaining combat readiness by permanent-readiness troops (forces) without conducting additional mobilisation activities, to successfully fulfil tasks simultaneously in two armed conflicts of any type, as well as carry out peacekeeping operations both on their own and as part of multinational peacekeeping forces;

➤ in case of the aggravation of the military-political and military-strategic situation - to ensure the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and contain the escalation of the situation by using strategic deterrence forces and manoeuvring permanent readiness forces;

➤ in wartime, to repulse by available forces an air-space attack by the enemy and, following a large-scale strategic deployment, fulfil tasks simultaneously in two local wars.

So, the nature of the tasks facing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, considering the specific features of armed conflicts and wars in which they may be involved, requires the formulation of new approaches to their development.
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. CHIEF PRIORITIES

Major priorities in the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are determined by the nature of challenges to the national security as well as by geopolitical priorities in the development of the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must meet several fundamental requirements. These requirements will determine the basic parameters of the country’s military development:

- strategic deterrence capability;
- high combat and mobilization readiness;
- strategic mobility;
- high manning standards; well-trained personnel;
- availability of up-to-date equipment and resources.

Fulfilment of these requirements makes it possible to identify major priorities in reforming and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at present and for the foreseeable future. The foremost of these priorities are as follows:

1. Preservation of Strategic Deterrence Force potential.
2. Increased number of permanent readiness units and formations as a basis for subsequent establishment of groups of forces.
3. Improvement of operational (combat) training of troops (forces).
4. Improvement of the Armed Forces’ manning system.
5. Implementation of the program for the modernization of armaments, military hardware and special equipment; their maintenance in full combat readiness.
6. Improvement of the military science and military education.
7. Improvement of military personnel’s social security arrangements, education and moral-psychological training.

PRESERVATION OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FORCE POTENTIAL

The policy pursued by the Russian Federation in the area of strategic deterrence is aimed at preventing any kind of power politics and aggression against Russia or its allies and, in case of aggression, guaranteed protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of Russia and its allies. The course led by the Russian Federation in the area of strategic deterrence is based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

**Power politics** - a combination of military supported actions undertaken by a state (unilaterally or as part of a coalition) to achieve its goals. Such actions seek to compel the opposing side to make concessions by a threat of using the military force or demonstration of military might when the goals in question do not require resort to a large-scale employment of combat-ready troops or when such employment is impossible or undesirable.
and the effective Russian legislation, it takes full account of the international obligations undertaken by the Russian Federation, is shaped and implemented in compliance with the Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Concept of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and other legislative acts which regulate the sphere of the national security of the Russian Federation.

The objectives of strategic deterrence are as follows:

➤ in peacetime - to prevent power politics and aggression against Russia or its allies;
➤ in wartime - de-escalation of aggression:
➤ termination of hostilities on conditions acceptable to Russia;
➤ impair the adversary’s capability to a target level.

To accomplish the tasks of strategic deterrence, the Armed Forces must be prepared to demonstrate their military presence and resolution to use force. This strategy may be implemented through measured combat engagement of selected components of the **Strategic Deterrence Force**, enhancement of its combat readiness, conduct of exercises and changes in deployment of selected components of the Strategic Deterrence Force.

The Strategic Deterrence Force (SDF) comprise the Strategic Missile Forces, Strategic Nuclear Air Forces and Strategic Nuclear Navy Forces. The efficiency of deterrence will be based on their ability to inflict retaliatory damage of such **proportion that would effectively challenge the feasibility of attaining the aims of a potential aggression**.

Russia will define the structure of its Nuclear Forces at its own discretion. In doing so, it will be guided solely by its national security interests, its international and allied commitments, and the necessity to maintain global strategic stability.

Russia is strongly committed to unconditional fulfilment of all the international treaties and agreements it has signed and ratified. This applies to the START 1 Treaty, according to which by December 5, 2001 Russia had established the following missile deployment ceilings:

- total number of operational ground-based ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers - no more than 1,600 units (including no more than 154 heavy ICBMs);
- total number of warheads (according to the accepted counting rules) mounted on the operational ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers - no more than 6,000 units, including warheads mounted on the operational ICBMs and SLBMs - no more than 4,900 units, of which no more than 1,540 warheads - on heavy ICBMs and no more than 1,100 warheads - on mobile ICBMs.

**De-escalation of aggression** forcing the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons.

The aggregate throw weight of all operational ICBMs and SLBMs must not exceed 3,600 tons.
In accordance with the SOR Treaty, by December 31, 2012, the total number of nuclear warheads must not exceed the level of 1,700-2,200 units.

Development of the **ground-based element of the Strategic Deterrence Force - the Strategic Missile Forces** - will be carried out with the view of their ultimate establishment as a fighting aim of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and optimization of their composition in compliance with Russia’s commitments concerning strategic offensive weapons (START-1, SOR Treaties), and will depend on their performance.

By 2007-2008, the Strategic Missile Forces will comprise no more than ten missile divisions. This will allow to cut financial and material expenditure on the production of hardware for and the further use of inefficient missile systems. The resources saved thereby will be channeled into the development of effective and advanced missile systems.

In the development of the **air component of the Strategic Deterrence Force**, the spotlight must be put on the modernization of the TU-160 bomber as a multifunctional aircraft capable of carrying precision cruise missiles (conventional and nuclear) and bombs (including precision guided ones), as well as of performing effective reconnaissance and jamming functions.

**Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces** will also see further development. To improve performance characteristics of the SSBNs, it is planned to intensify the R&D work create a new missile complex and develop an SSBN of the next generation.

The further advancement of the Strategic Deterrence Force is impossible without undertaking a series of efforts aimed at maintaining combat readiness of the SDF units and formations at the required level.

The first group of these efforts aims to reduce the time required for the SDF capacity to activate and ensure reliable operation of the control and guidance systems as well as relevant means and systems of communication.

The second group of these efforts involves the extension of service life of the missile systems. These measures will be the most cost consuming, but the volume of resources envisaged for financing repair, maintenance and operation of the missile systems inspires optimism.

The third group of these efforts entails the maintenance of the combat strength of the Strategic Deterrence Force. The decommissioned missile systems will be replaced with systems of the next generation.
The fourth group of these efforts provides for expanding of the space component of the SDF control system. The number of space vehicles attached to the Strategic Deterrence Forces will be substantially increased.

INCREASED NUMBER OF PERMANENT READINESS UNITS AND FORMATIONS AS A BASIS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUPS OF TROOPS (FORCES)

With due account taken of combat experience gained in the 1990s, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation consider the optimization of their effective fighting strength as one of its top priorities with a view to organizing task forces under single command capable of performing tasks with a peacetime prescribed strength.

The chief criteria distinguishing the newly established groups of forces from their predecessors are mobility, materiel self-sufficiency, adequate manning levels, and availability of required weapons and military hardware, which allow their engagement in any part of the conflict zone, as well as outside the latter.

The newly created groups of forces are established on the territorial principle. It allows to conduct joint operations, operational and combat training, combat interaction, coordination of efforts, operational and combat control and comprehensive logistical support.

The units and formations of permanent readiness, as well as echeloned permanent readiness units and formations of skeleton strength constitute the core of the above groups of troops (forces).

Permanent readiness forces are units and formations capable of performing combat tasks in peace as well as wartime without recourse to mobilization resources.

These groups of troops (forces) have the following responsibilities:

**IN PEACETIME:**

- to participate in defending the state’s national interests, including by taking measures to be undertaken in order to demonstrate Russia’s military potential;
- to participate in peacekeeping operations in compliance with the country’s international commitments;
- to assist other troops, military formations and bodies of the Russian Federation in performing such vital duties as protection of Russia’s state borders, prevention of internal conflicts and other situations involving armed violence, elimination of conse-
quences of natural and technogenic disasters, catastrophes, and other emergencies.

**IN EMERGENCY SITUATION**
*(WHEN INTRODUCING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY):*

- to participate in maintaining the state of emergency, including in areas of internal armed conflicts;
- to eliminate (by delivering military strikes) illegal armed units, terrorist groups and organizations, to destroy their bases, training centres, depots and communications facilities;
- to take an active part, jointly with other troops, military formations and bodies, in the fight against terrorism, as well as in the efforts to ensure safe navigation of Russian ships at sea and protection of the national air space.

**IN WARTIME:**

- to localize (neutralize) the possible armed conflicts in all strategically vital areas, and repel aggressions of a local scale.

  The composition of the permanent readiness troops (forces) as well as their system of control and comprehensive logistical support are adequate to the nature of threats to security of the Russian Federation. The groups of forces are deployed in every strategically vital area, their structure may be different from one location to another to be best suited for countering any type of threat to Russia’s national security. The groups are to be sufficiently mobile so that they could be rapidly moved to any other area (region) for localization (neutralization) of any possible armed conflict.

With due consideration for Russia’s vast territory, military transport aviation will be of special importance in carrying out such force redeployment operations.

The term "combat flexibility" involves the following:

- structural flexibility enabling military units and formations of permanent readiness to carry out required combat action in any type of conflict;
- military technical flexibility, that is, a policy aimed at equipping the Armed Forces with weapons and materiel necessary for battlefield operations in a wide range of possible armed conflicts;
- optimization of the combat training system to ensure that servicemen have adequate combat skills effective in any type of conflicts, including the internal ones.

To ensure the efficient performance in any type of an armed conflict that may occur in Russia, the above groups of troops (forces) include permanent readiness units and formations of different services and fighting arms of the Armed Forces, with the core strength consisting of all-arms units and formations, as well as precision fire attack systems of other services of the Armed Forces.

In addition to the permanent readiness groups of troops (forces), an appropriate group of reserve troops (forces) is being set up in strategic directions, comprising an all-arms reserve group (permanent readiness units and formations of the Airborne Force, missile forces and artillery), a Navy reserve group (permanent readiness units of the Air Force and the Air Defence Force of the Navy) and the reserve of the central command (permanent readiness units and formations of the GRU of the General Staff;
Electronic Warfare; Radiological, Chemical and Biological Command, as well as technical maintenance and logistics units).

IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATIONAL (COMBAT) TRAINING OF FORCES

The operational (combat) training is aimed at upgrading the efficiency of staff and unit command elements and the professional skills of military personnel to fulfil the tasks assigned to them.

The operational and combat training in the Armed Forces ought to be carried out with due regard for changes in the nature of military and other threats to Russia, the necessity to guarantee the national military security, new trends in the nature of the armed struggle and combat techniques, areas of interest, specifics of the theatre of operation and potential enemy.

In peacetime, the Armed Forces’ training ought to be carried out mostly in the combat simulating format.

FIRST

With regard to operational training, the spotlight will be on the development of new forms and methods of engaging groups of troops (forces) and formations to localize and neutralize possible armed conflicts, as well as to repulse a large-scale aggression involving the use of conventional or nuclear arms. Further efforts will be taken to improve the leadership style and methods used by commanding officers (commanders) for effective troops management in conditions of intensive electronic and information countermeasures.

All measures aimed at improving operational training of troops (forces) in the country’s strategic areas must involve practical steps towards preventing any attempts to put power pressure on Russia, and precluding any armed provocations, terrorist attacks. Intensive work must be continued to develop effective defence against the enemy’s air assault.

The military exercises to be conducted in 2004 will focus on improving the mobility of all-armed forces and facilities, in particular, studying the possibility of conducting inter-theater redeployment.

The number of exercises and other combat training operations undertaken in 2002 across all services of the Russian Armed Forces exceeded the 2001 level, with overall expenditure on combat training rising 2.2 times. In the first nine months of 2003, this trend showed signs of further consolidation. The Defence Ministry’s 2004 draft budget envisages allocation of about 16 percent of its funds for the development of the combat training system.

Experience proves that operational training must not be confined solely to conducting map games and exercises; it is necessary to resume the practice of field training manoeuvres and command post exercises involving the required number of troops. Moreover, it is necessary to plan all combat training operations with due regard for command-post exercises conducted by the strategic and operational units of the respective Command.

Special attention in planning combat training should be paid to the application of electronic topog-
graphic maps (ETM) as one of the most effective methods and means of topogeodetic support for troops. The ETM offers the advantage of prompt and automatic analysis of the area to facilitate decision-making, planning and execution of operations (combat actions), organizing interaction and control of troops. The ETM also makes it possible to ensure the most effective use of weapons and hardware, including precision weapons.

The extensive use of digital information about the area raises the efficiency of troops and weapons by 50-70 percent.

The C² training emphasizes the need to cross-train staff officers in related functional areas and duties in a position one or two echelons above their current assignment. Special attention should be paid to practical efforts aimed at establishing and maintaining interaction with commands of military units and formations of various services of the Armed Forces, the Airborne Force, and other troops of the Russian Federation. The algorithm of leadership training at the operational (tactical) level must necessarily include joint training sessions with administrative personnel of security agencies of the Russian Federation.

SECOND

Combat training should be task-oriented and address the objectives pursued by the military units and formations. At present, the number of field training operations has increased by 50 percent. In the foreseeable future, this trend is bound to gain momentum. Similarly, the number of field firing and battlefield exercises involving aviation, artillery and units of other security agencies.

Primarily, the combat training system shall target the battalion as the chief tactical unit in local and frontier armed conflicts, as well as in peacekeeping operations. Tactical-level commanding officers shall be trained with due consideration for their ability to control not merely their own personnel but also the attached and supporting forces and means, to organize and maintain coordination and combat cohesion with neighboring units, forces assigned to the senior commander and other troops, military formations and agencies.
Special attention shall be focused on improving military units’ ability to act effectively in a low-strength capacity. Motorized rifle formations, ranging from platoon to battalion, comprise the majority of low-strength units in the Land Force. Hence the considerably stiffer requirements of tactical self-reliance of such units. Primarily, the necessity for this sort of training arises from the conclusion that in armed conflicts these units will most likely deal not with a traditional enemy but a mixture of medley forces substantially varying in terms of military training and materiel diversity. Traditionally, such adversary units resort to subversion, terror guerilla warfare.

It is necessary to improve the skills of commanding officers of all levels in operational and tactical camouflage, establishment of proper relations with local population.

THIRD

To upgrade the personnel’s skills, special attention is to be paid to officer training of the platoon, company and battalion levels, with particular focus on organization and conduct of reconnaissance operations, adjustment of artillery and tank fire (IFV, APC), guidance of frontline and army aviation, and formulation of an effective fire plan.

To improve the combat training of pilots, it is necessary to ensure substantial growth of resources for full-fledged training, particularly for the air units deployed in unstable regions. Air crews must have sufficient annual flying time to be able to carry out their combat missions. Proper simulation facilities need also to be provided for air crews to improve their operational proficiency in using precision weapons systems.

Due efforts must also be taken to ensure that tactical units and small groups operating independently from the bulk force and employing unconventional tactics in forest-and-mountain environment be thoroughly equipped with the required gear and outfit. Effective application of unconventional methods ought to be a vital component of combat training of special forces officers, as well as those of other arms of service, including logistics.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TARGET PROGRAM OF TRANSITION TO RECRUITING CONTRACT SERVICEMEN TO SOME MILITARY UNITS AND FORMATIONS

The system of manning used before the latest resolutions of the Russian Government no longer meets contemporary requirements. Many experts were rightfully concerned that it would not ensure adequate manning levels and maintain the required military strength of the state after 2005. There are sever-
al reasons for this situation: the shortage of the draft-age manpower, liberal legislation allowing about 90 percent of eligible young men to avoid conscription, etc.

Due account is also to be taken of the fact that 2005 will mark the beginning of the country’s slide into a demographic "pit", with the latter getting deeper every subsequent year until 2010.

The above factors call for crucial changes in the army recruitment pattern. Failure to accomplish such changes will make it impossible to maintain combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the required level. The decisions recently adopted by the Government have radically changed the situation in this area. Partial transition of the country’s Armed Forces to the contract-based pattern of recruitment is neither a politically-motivated declaration nor the end goal of the Armed Forces’ development. It is one in a range of measures taken to enhance combat efficiency of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and ensure a level of competence allowing them to successfully meet any challenges to national security in compliance with the orders of the President of the Russian Federation.

Partial transition of the Armed Forces to the contract-based recruitment pattern is not considered as the aim of their development and improvement but as a tool instrumental in enhancing the country’s defence potential as well as combat readiness of its Armed Forces. The decision to introduce the contract-based recruitment pattern in some units and formations of the Armed Forces is not a politically-motivated declaration made without due consideration of financial and
organizational implications. Rather, it is a result of a long painstaking evaluation of the nation’s objective capabilities.

The main objectives of the ongoing reform in the army recruitment system are as follows:

➤ to set up a centralized, structurally optimized and permanently guided system of recruitment of contract servicemen to the troops (forces) of the country’s military organization;

➤ to improve the legislation regulating the activity of the federal bodies of executive authority related to all aspects of introducing the contract-based system of manning with soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sergents major;

➤ to optimize the planning methods employed in transition to the new recruitment system, as well as respective phases of its implementation and deadlines set for building up contract-based manning levels to required strength, taking proper consideration of the economic and social situation in the country, and economic development forecasts;

➤ stage-by-stage reorganization of the existing system of recruitment, selection, enrollment, training and re-training of contract servicemen;

➤ improvement of the social infrastructure of military service to attract contract personnel.

The initial experience in manning the Armed Forces with contract servicemen shows that two major conditions are to be met to ensure successful implementation of the army recruitment reform: adequate and steady funding and availability of skilled contract personnel. Current practices display a high personnel turnover among the contract servicemen. This means that, as things stand now, the latter do not represent the best segment of the country’s youth. At present, the majority of contract enlistees comprise people who have, for various reasons, failed to fulfil themselves in civil life.

In view of that, in 2003, the Federal target Program of transition to recruiting contract servicemen to some military units and formations in 2004-2007 was drawn up. Primarily, the Program envisions fundamental positive shifts in public opinion regarding the state’s military structure and servicemen of all categories, allocation of the necessary financial and material resources for the adequate and timely remuneration of their service, and establishment of attractive working and living conditions for them.

The program was developed by the Defence Ministry, Economic Development and Trade Ministry, Finance Ministry and other ministries and agencies authorized by law to maintain a military force. An interdepartmental working group, including representatives of the Finance Ministry, was set up to hammer out provisions of the Program. Members of the group went to various permanent readiness units and formations to analyze the situation on the spot. They also estimated the costs incurred by the introduction of the contract-based recruitment pattern in these units. The group’s estimate of federal budget allocations required for the implementation of a vast range of items necessary for meeting the program’s objectives (within the Government-approved parameters) originally averaged 139.3 billion rubles. Later, with due regard to the Finance Ministry’s opinion, the funds to be released for the implementation of the program were substantially scaled down to 79.1 billion rubles, with military units and formations under the jurisdiction of the Special Construction Ministry and Railways Ministry excluded from the overall military contingent assigned for transition to the contract-based recruitment pattern.

The program envisages the allocation of 64.2 billion
rubles for social security and army appeal building measures, and $14.9$ billion rubles for strengthening combat readiness of the units and formations to be transferred to the contract-based recruitment pattern.

From 2004 to 2007 the program plans to introduce the new recruitment practices in as many as 80 military units and formations with the numerical strength of 147,500 men, including 72 formations and one unit of the Armed Forces, 3 formations of the Federal Frontier Service, and 5 formations of the Internal Troops of the Interior Ministry.

In annual terms the respective figures for planned allocations and the numerical strength of contract servicemen are as follows:

- 2004 - 9.7 billion rubles; 15,700 men;
- 2005 - 20.9 billion rubles; 54,500 men;
- 2006 - 21.7 billion rubles; 26,800 men;
- 2007 - 26.8 billion rubles; 50,600 men;

To set up basic incentives for would-be contract servicemen, the Program envisages raising the monthly bonus paid for combat training in special conditions to 3,300 rubles per serviceman, for those deployed in the Chechen Republic the bonus will be raised still further - to 5,000 rubles a month (in total, a first-year private of the enlisted personnel is to receive about 6,000 rubles a month, the one deployed in the Chechen Republic - 15,000 rubles a month).

The current benefits exempting contract servicemen and members of their families from paying fares when en route to pre-declared holiday destinations, which were established by the applicable legislation, are to be replaced with compensatory travel allowances.

The implementation of the Program will help improve combat training standards and prevent the dispatch of conscripted sergeants and privates to the Chechen Republic.

The contract-based recruitment pattern is going to be introduced step by step following the creation of the necessary infrastructure, with the permanent readiness units and formations of the Armed Forces, Interior Ministry and Federal Frontier Service deployed in the North Caucasus to pioneer the transition.

Contract servicemen are to make up the core of the highly-skilled sergeant strength in the Armed Forces. Establishment of the professional sergeant corps aims to radically upgrade combat training standards and maintain military discipline.

The implementation of the above measures will let the Armed Forces optimize its system of recruiting contract personnel in the context of the ongoing modernization of the Armed Forces conducted to ensure qualitative and quantitative improvement of the enlisted personnel.

The gradual transition to the new recruitment pattern will go in tandem with consistent reduction of the length of conscripted service. The duration of draft service will be contingent on the number of available
The priority tasks of the development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation

By plan, the compulsory service period is to be reduced to 12 months, starting 2008. Among other things, this move will require the establishment of an optimal ratio between different categories of servicemen in the peacetime military strength and trained reserve. The realization of the targeted Federal program will allow the state to initiate a substantial cutback of the mobilization reserve.

At the same time, the implementation of the program for the partial introduction of the contract-based recruitment pattern in Russia’s Armed Forces does not eliminate the necessity to keep and improve the mobilization reserve system.

The need to maintain a mobilization reserve of various classes arises from a requirement to have manning resources capable of ensuring prompt reinforcement of the Russian Armed Forces in case the efforts made by the permanent readiness forces to deter or suppress an armed conflict fail to yield positive results. To secure guaranteed availability of sufficient and well-trained mobilization personnel for manning the troops (forces) in such situations, the state must develop a new system of training and maintaining an adequate mobilization strength.

The implementation of the program for modernizing weapons, military and special equipment (WMSE); maintenance of WMSE in combat-ready condition

At present, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are properly equipped with the basic weapons systems, military hardware and other matériel. However, a qualitative analysis reveals that advanced weapons and military hardware account for only 20-30 percent of the total amount whereas in the world’s leading armies the share of up-to-date weaponry exceeds 70 percent.

The current status quo grants Russia a comparatively short buffer period - some 10-15 years - during which the country must, on the one hand, maintain its existing capabilities at a proper level and, on the other hand, to upgrade its recent R&D technological achievements to the standard adequate for launching a large-scale re-equipment of the army and navy when this period expires.

2003 saw the development and adoption of the fundamental documents regulating Russia’s military-technical policy and specifying the range of key military technologies for the long term.

The above plans and programs focus on the modernization of weapons, military and special equipment (WMSE). In a short term, the state is going to fund research and development of weapons and military equipment in three major areas:

- maintenance of permanent readiness units’ WMSE in combat-ready condition;
- completion of R&D work revolutionizing weapons performance characteristics;
- modernization of outdated weapons.

The proposed program of technical re-equipment will be based on the balanced development of the strategic deterrence forces, combat control (information support) systems, and general-purpose forces.

Special attention will be paid to the development of weapons and military equipment (WME) systems capable of making a crucial impact on the outcome
of future wars: long-range precision weapons, recon-
naissance and target designation systems (ground-, 
air-, and space-based), diverse jamming equipment, 
and automated forces and weapons control systems.

The implementation of the proposed measures will 
raise the share of advanced weapons and hardware 
in the Armed Forces to 35 percent by 2010. By 2015, 
this share will grow to 40-45 percent. By 2020-2025, 
the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian 
Federation will be completely re-armed and 
re-equipped.

Gradual reduction of the Armed Forces’ mainte-
nance costs by 2025 will let the state concurrently 
increase funding of R&D, procurement, moderniza-
tion and repair of weapons and hardware to 50-60 
percent of the national defence budget.

The share of funds earmarked for the develop-
ment of WME for general-purpose troops of the 
Armed Forces shall account for no less than 80 per-
cent of the total expenditure on R&D, procurement 
and repair of the Armed Forces’ WME in general.

It is impossible to effectively address the task of 
providing the Armed Forces with up-to-date weapons 
and military equipment and keeping the tight dead-
lines without bringing the current WME procurement 
system in line with requirements of the time.

At present, there are as many as 20 major WME 
buyers (there were 57 in 1997, and 29 in 1999). In 
order to minimize the number of purchasing agents, 
a decision was made to leave one (unified) purchas-
ing agent in each service branch of the Armed 
Forces. Each of these agents will be responsible for 
meeting the general targets of the military-technical 
policy in its own specific functional area.

To centralize WME orders of and procurement by 
the Defence Ministry and other federal agencies 
maintaining a military force, to streamline spending 
and eliminate overlapping activities in purchasing, 
acceptance, and supplies, the President of the

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**THE PRIORITY TASKS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit resource availability</th>
<th>is an averaged cost parameter representing a ratio of the total expenditure on the development and engagement of the Armed Forces within a given period of time (usually, one year), financial allocations, energy, raw materials and other necessary resources and assets to total numerical strength of the Armed Forces.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit expenditure on combat training</td>
<td>is an averaged indicator of spending on combat training of one serviceman. It represents a ratio of funds allocated on combat training of Armed Forces to the total numerical strength of Armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit expenditure on Weapons, Military and Special Equipment (WMSE) acquisition</td>
<td>is an averaged cost parameter representing a ratio of total funds allocated for WMSE acquisition to the total numerical strength of the Armed Forces.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Russian Federation issued Decree No. 311 of March 
11, 2003 on the establishment of the State Defence 
Order Committee under the Defence Ministry of the 
Russian Federation.

The implementation of priority projects in reorga-
nization of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation is expected to stimulate growth of the 
latter’s key parameters and qualitative characteris-
tics (compared to the year 2000):
THE PRIORITY TASKS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

◆ unit resource availability 2.2 times by 2005 and 4 times by 2010;
◆ unit combat training exp enditure 2.3 and 3 times respectively;
◆ unit WME acquisition expenditure 3 and 6 times respectively.

IMPROVEMENT OF LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM

The integration of all support services of the Armed Forces and other forces of the Russian Federation is one of the principal targets in the development of the country’s military organization. This integration will come about through the transition to the interdepartmental (coordinated) systems of technical and logistical support (ISTLS) of the Armed Forces, other forces, military formations and agencies of the Russian Federation.

The main objective of the Armed Forces’ transition to ISTLS is to enhance efficiency of technical and logistical support of all military formations through the integration of appropriate segments of Russia’s power ministries and agencies as well as the joint cost-effective use of the existing material and technical base and infrastructure.

The newly-established systems will provide for territorial integration of their storage, transporta- tion, medical and other infrastructures, the latter being managed by one control centre. This will let technical and logistical support be provided to all the country’s military forces irrespective of their departmental affiliation and specific chain of com- mand, and will involve military formations permanently stationed in a given military district as well as those deployed there for performance of specific missions.

A step-by-step transition of the Armed Forces and other military forces and formations of the Russian Federation to interdepartmental (coordinated) uni- fied systems of logistical and technical support is to be accomplished by 2006.

The planned improvement of the technical support system will be based on the establishment of a unified normative framework for a centralized target programme-oriented planning of orders, supplies and operation of WMSE and other material resources as well as the introduction of measures aimed at promoting technical support of the country’s military development in peacetime, crises and wartime.

As top priority, before the end of 2003, the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation jointly with other federal agencies of the executive authority involved must work out a standard legislation regulating the WME handover and disposal procedures for duly authorized federal executive bodies.

Starting in 2004, all WME disposal operations will be carried out solely by duly authorized federal executive bodies.

The proposed plan envisages the introduction by 2005 of a territorial approach in performing major repairs of weapons, military hardware and general-purpose equipment. It also calls for ensuring provi- sion of cost-effective technical support for groups of troops (forces) irrespective of their departmental
In addition, the plan will help improve the system of accumulation and distribution of material resources.

In future, the plan calls for greater efforts in reconditioning and modernization of all types of WMSE currently employed by troops and military formations or stored in depots. All the WMSE in stock must be operational and kept in good repair.

The priority areas in the improvement of the logistical support system are as follows: consistency in pursuing a uniform policy of logistics development; the introduction of a uniform pricing policy in purchasing general-purpose merchandise; the establishment of a uniform regulatory legal base for the logistical support of the Armed Forces as well as other forces and military formations of the Russian Federation; coordination of the departmental systems of logistical support in such vital areas as the supply of fuel and lubricants, clothing and rations, and training of logistics officers; stockpiling of material and technical reserves for joint actions of the Armed Forces and other forces and military formations of the Russian Federation in wartime and crises.

In 2006-2010, the logistical support system is to ensure complete provision of all required supplies to military units and formations, and build-up of the contingency and working stocks to the level prescribed by statute regulations.

The further stages of transition to ISTLS in the period up to 2020 include the adaptation of the system and improvement of its performance characteristics through the introduction of competitive tender-based procurement techniques, standardization and unification of supplied items, better performance of military medical service, and logistics personnel training.

The ultimate objective of the above-mentioned agenda is to eliminate overlapped functions and duplicate structures or reorient the latter to the fulfil-
ment of other defence-related tasks, and to ensure, if required effective joint engagement of the Armed Forces together with the military formations operating under command of power ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation.

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

The implementation of the afore-mentioned priorities of reforming and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is impossible without the creation of a strong scientific and manpower potentials. The latter provide the general foundation of the proposed package of military reforms.

The Armed Forces’ military research complex comprises research organizations of the Defence Ministry, higher educational institutions of the Defence Ministry, institutions conducting feasibility studies substantiating effective policies in organization, development, training, engagement and maintenance of Russia’s Armed Forces in real and projected geostrategic, political, economic and demographic situations.

The successful solution of the current problems confronting the country's military science is impossible without a fundamental reorganization of the entire military research complex. This reorganization is one of the most difficult elements in the ongoing modernization of the Russian Armed Forces. The relevance of decisions taken in this area is of exceptional value as an error may entail very harmful, even if currently imperceptible, consequences for the country’s military security.

With due account of the efforts already taken in reforming the military research complex, the principal short-term goals in this area are as follows:

◆ advanced development of the theoretical base underlying organization, training and employment of the Armed Forces, analysis of conditions and provision of recommendations on improvement of their structure, forms and methods of the combat groups of forces, the development of weapons and military hardware, and the study of other relevant issues;

◆ implementation of the program promoting the use of integrated situational forecast and analysis systems which substantially expand the potential of operational troops control;

◆ improvement of the Armed Forces’ military research complex, its composition, structure, and
Higher Military Education Network of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation

**TOTAL:**
- 57 higher educational institutions and 22 affiliates
- 10 military academies
  - Train military officers
- 9 military universities
- 38 military colleges
- Nearly 15,000 men in 400 specialties and areas of expertise
numerical strength (with due consideration of the current requirements), consolidation of the regulatory legal base determining the status, conditions and modus operandi of the whole complex, establishment of an effective incentive scheme for research and teaching personnel, and development of the laboratory research facilities.

The chief efforts shall be concentrated on the development of the following sectors of the military research complex:

➤ improvement of the research planning system, coordination of scientific activities undertaken by research institutions under the Defence Ministry, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and other ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation conducting scientific defence-related investigations;

➤ optimization of the composition and structure of research institutions, research units of universities and colleges, and other research organizations;

➤ further automation and computerization of research techniques, including the information support system;

➤ improvement of the researcher training system, promotion of R&D-friendly organizational patterns to encourage research teams’ integrated approach in handling major theoretical and technological problems of military science;

➤ development of simulation and laboratory facilities;

➤ consolidation of skilled personnel’s potential, as well as financial, material and technical base of research and educational institutions.

The further improvement of the military research complex requires the implementation of the following structural, organizational, research and technological measures:

1. Formation of systemic sectoral and inter-sectoral scientific patterns, problems and issues integrating military-political, operational-strategic, military-economic and military-technical research in the sphere of organization, development and commitment of the Armed Forces. The accomplishment of this mission must be a responsibility of the standing inter-sectoral (fundamental science, applied science of the Defence Ministry and defence industry) and sectoral coordination councils.

2. Elaboration and introduction of an effective legislative mechanism encouraging scientists engaged in research centers of the Defence Ministry and defence-related industrial sectors to take part in the development and evaluation of the military-political decisions through the appropriate State Duma committees and the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
3. In-depth analysis of the existing and long-term R&D plans undertaken in the interests of the Defence Ministry and specific service branches of the Armed Forces; overhaul and re-formulation of these plans on the basis of the management-by-objectives planning principles.

4. Creation and introduction of a computer-aided planning system utilizing a comprehensive modern database of the Defence Ministry’s R&D activities. In the years to come, this system is to develop into a unified automated system of planning all the Defence Ministry’s research work with direct access to information systems and databases of military research committees and research organizations, as well as those of higher educational institutions of the services of the Armed Forces. The objective of the above is to coordinate, monitor and oversee the activities carried out by the military research organizations and higher military educational institutions in planning and conducting research work and assessing their results.

5. To ensure the prompt elaboration of the armaments program and state defence order and coordination of relevant documents with the Economic Development and Trade Ministry and various industrial organizations, it is necessary to create a restricted-access automated computer network covering all individual sections of the armaments program and state defence order. The network should grant access only to the following agencies and organizations: the Directorate of the head of armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, of offices of heads of armaments and defence research committees of the Armed Forces’ services (arms) research central institutions of the Armed Forces’ services.

6. Restoration of the centralized system of military-technical and scientific information support for research organizations and higher educational institutions of the Defence Ministry via the military research committees of the Armed Forces’ services and arms according to the coordinated check-lists. Subsequently, this system is to develop into an automated research information exchange system. The modernization of the Armed Forces requires constant upgrade of skills and qualifications of the officer corps, which necessitates major changes in the military personnel training system, primarily, in the higher military schools.

The main objective of the higher military education system has always been to provide for stable influx of highly qualified officers to the ranks and to ensure continuous advancement of their proficiency and general cultural standards. Graduates of higher
military schools must live up to the high moral and ethical standards of a citizen and defender of the Fatherland. There is a number of vital issues in this area that require thorough consideration and solution.

At present, Russia’s higher military education system is structured according to a departmental pattern. This accounts for the current squandering and misuse of scanty financial resources allocated for military education. Suffice it to say that in addition to the Defence Ministry, six other military education agencies have their own systems of training officers for power agencies.

Many military colleges and universities offer training in just one or two specialties. On the whole, the current specialty training system abounds in redundant elements and overlapping functions.

Comparison shows that the Defence Ministry’s training curricula for major military occupational specialties are duplicated in educational establishments of the FSB Border Guards Service by 88 percent, the Emergencies Ministry by 60 percent, the Interior Ministry by 50 percent, and the Federal Railway Troops Service by 43 percent. One should bear in mind, however, that the training and subsistence costs per cadet in the Defence Ministry’s colleges and universities are 1.9 times lower than, for example, in similar institutions of the FSB Border Guards Service. Besides, every agency maintaining own institutions of military training has to keep an administrative structure to oversee its educational system.

Today, we have to admit that the previous policy aimed at integration of military academies with military colleges (as the academies’ affiliates) was wrong. It has resulted in downgrading the status of the backbone military colleges and institutions and led to outflow of highly-qualified teaching staff.

"Only highly educated people, perceptive to new ideas and recognizing new challenges, can cope with the tasks of such a great scope. And, of course, they are the people who have been brought up on the best military traditions of Russia."

(from President Putin’s speech at the gala reception held on July 25, 2003 in honour of graduates of military academies and universities).

The integration, actually a euphemism for "covert reduction", has brought about a situation when de jure there are only 57 higher military institutions operating under the Defence Ministry whereas de facto their number is by far higher. About half of the existing military institutions offer training to less than 1,000 cadets, which not only runs counter to proven international practices but also leads to substantial rise in high training costs and impedes the establishment of qualified teaching staffs.

The Defence Ministry no longer deems it cost-effective to concurrently train cadets in two specialties (a military one and a civilian one) at its educational institutions. In the past years, many young men have used training in military colleges and universities as a way to get free higher education, on the one hand, and as a ploy to evade military service, on the other. Taking advantage of deficiencies in the Russian legislation, 7,000 to 8,000 undergraduate cadets were annually leaving military colleges and universities in recent years to continue education at civilian institutions, whereas about 10,000 graduates
resigned every year in the rank of lieutenant shortly after qualifying for their diplomas.

Serious efforts need to be taken in order to minimize the risks caused by the current natural change of generations in the commissioned ranks when the officers trained in the Soviet era have retired or will retire in the coming years but their recently-trained replacements lack the required practical skills and theoretical knowledge. Deficiencies in training commissioned officers inevitably entail flaws in training soldiers and sergeants who constitute the decisive strength on the battlefield. The problem cannot be resolved without a significant upgrade in the proficiency and status of the commanding and teaching staff of military educational institutions.

Another issue of utmost importance concerns restoration of the military and technical infrastructure of military colleges and universities. It was on a continuous decline for more than a decade and to date still cannot provide the support required for effective military training of a skilled officer corps. Fortunately, the last few years have seen allocation of substantial funds from the state budget specifically for development of the material and technical base of the military education system. The situation in this area is steadily improving: military equipment is back in use on training grounds and trainer aircraft are back in air for flying practice. Cadets still have to develop most of their practical skills to use simulators, but the vital program of equipping military colleges and universi-
ties with samples of advanced weapons and materiel is being steadily implemented. This is of crucial importance for building up the core cadre of the future Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Training of officers in the military colleges and universities ought to be carried out with due account of the ever changing requirements of contemporary warfare as well as advancement of its means, forms and methods. Not all of the country’s military educational establishments live up the standard.

Special attention ought to be paid to training reserve officers at the military training departments of civilian colleges and universities of the Russian Federation. The performance of the majority of these departments falls short of the targets set for them. Frequently, the latter train too many officers in one military occupational specialty and too few in another, openly violating the approved plans and curricula. Either deviation is unacceptable as this practice leads to emergence of redundant reserve officers in some military occupational specialties and shortage of those in others. It also causes wastage of substantial financial resources. As a result, today only one in every ten specialists trained at these departments is required by the Armed Forces.

This situation is a direct consequence of the lobbyist practices of previous years. The number of military training departments providing instruction in military occupational specialties of limited demand for the Defence Ministry has increased dramatically.

The main reasons accounting for the current state of affairs are as follows: the lack of consistent and systemic approach to the organization of military education and military training in terms of substance and content; inadequate proficiency and methodology awareness of instructors; loose control over the training process in military educational institutions, and over the organization of professional and combat training practices in the armed forces.

It is vitally important that graduates of the military colleges and universities were qualified professionals well versed in contemporary training methodology and capable of applying effective training techniques in instruction of their subordinate personnel. All the curricula and tuition subjects must be configured so as to be organic components of a consistent system of higher military education, with due focus on the specifics of each phase of the training course. Accordingly, every commander must be fully conscious of the need to strictly observe the approved procedure in preparing and conducting each activity aimed at upgrading his subordinates’ qualifications as well as the standard of the training process on the whole. The system must be based on simple teaching principles clear to everyone involved.
Partial introduction of the contract-based recruitment pattern in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation also calls for substantial improvement in the system of higher military education. Today, an officer must be prepared to exercise effective command of his subordinate personnel in conditions when the latter may possess significant educational background, vast personal experience, etc.

To address the most vital problems of military training, the Government, on May 27, 2002, adopted the federal program "Reform of the System of Military Education in the Russian Federation Until 2010".

In the next few years, the reform of the country's system of military education will be going on with due reference to the establishment of the interdepartmental (coordinated) system of military occupational specialty training designed to serve the interests of the Armed Forces as well as of other military forces, formations and agencies.

Until 2005, all parameters of the military education system must be brought in line with new objectives, structure and numerical strength of the country's military organization as well as with the general service routines of commissioned officers. The reformed military colleges, universities and research organizations shall form a base for the establishment of specialized integrated research and educational centres.

In 2006-2010, organizational, legal and economic conditions are to be created for the establishment of a new national system of military education. This system will comprise the following elements:

- military educational institutions and civilian colleges and universities providing, on a contract basis, a full course of military training for army contractees in an officer rank;
- military training departments of civilian colleges and universities providing instruction to reserve officers;
- institutions of additional professional education engaged in re-training commissioned officers and upgrading their skills and qualifications.

**IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL’S SOCIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS**

According to the Federal law "On Military Duty and Military Service", the military service is a specific kind of federal public service. President of the Russian Federation, the Security Council and the Defence Ministry seek to do everything in their power to enhance prestige of military service.

It must be openly acknowledged that a failure to implement a consistent and radical reform capable of meeting vital social needs of servicemen may in the end result in shortages of junior- and middle rank officers. Serious efforts have been taken lately to reverse the trend of junior officers’ outflow from the Armed Forces. The results, albeit successful for the time being, are not sufficient in the long term perspective. The officer corps is the backbone of any armed forces. Its degradation is tantamount to collapse of the military organization of a state. Currently, efforts to upgrade servicemen’s social
security arrangements are being taken in the following areas:

➤ increase in pay;
➤ increase in retirement pensions;
➤ improvement of servicemen’s housing conditions;
➤ social adjustment of retired servicemen;
➤ improvement of healthcare service and support.

Increase in pay tops the agenda of the planned social security arrangements. Whereas a desire to personally defend Motherland is a vital moral factor attracting young men to the ranks, there is no doubt that the amount of servicemen’s pay ought to be sufficient for stimulating public interest in the military service. A number of steps have been taken of late to increase pay disbursements.

Since January 1, 2002 the hazard and special duty bonus has been raised from 50 to 70 percent of the regular monthly allowance. Commanding officers now receive an additional monthly leadership increment of 300-500 rubles.

On July 1, 2002 a decision was taken that service-men’s rate of pay cannot be lower than salaries paid to federal civil servants in corresponding positions. In addition, the maximum monthly length-of-service increment (varying as per rank and position) was raised from 40 to 70 percent of the regular monthly allowance. On January 1, 2003 it was decreed that military personnel’s rank-specific pay cannot be lower than the skill benefits paid to federal civil servants in corresponding positions.

Due amendments have been made to the statutory legislation providing that contract servicemen’s pay be increased concurrently and commensurately with increase of federal civil servants’ salaries. Another decision envisages annual inflation-linked indexation of servicemen’s pay. In 2003, such indexation brought all servicemen’s pay up 11 percent starting October 1.

All measures providing for new substantially increased levels of servicemen’s monthly pay as well as some additional allowances are organically linked with the steps taken to unify the entire system of military monetary allowance. The latter is to be closely interlinked with the level of federal civil servants’ salaries and the state’s current social policy of replacing servicemen’s in-kind allowances with equivalent money compensation.

Increase in servicemen’s pay on July 1, 2002 immediately brought their incomes up by 40 to 50 percent. It must be acknowledged, however, that since then their real incomes and living standards have dropped back to the 2002 level due to inflation and higher electricity, housing and utilities charges.

Experience shows that the previous and current pay increase measures have failed to completely reverse the adverse trends detrimentally affecting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. As before, the tasks of ensuring an adequate pay for military personnel and substantial improvement of their living standards remain crucial aspects of the policy aimed at maintaining the officer corps - the core of the national armed forces - operational and effective.

With due regard for the actual rate of inflation, the Defence Ministry considers it vital to carry on the search for ways to further increase military pay. The Ministry intends to ensure a significant pay growth within the next 3 to 4 years. By 2010, the amount of
pay must grow fourfold as compared to the level of January 2002.

It is also important that the size and pattern of disbursement to military personnel engaged in different sectors of the state’s military organization had a common benchmark. The existing pay differences for servicemen engaged in the Armed Forces, law enforcement bodies and other government agencies adversely affect young men’s motivation to commit themselves to military service. A justifiable disparity of pay disbursed to servicemen engaged in different law-enforcement agencies can arise only from special allowances and bonuses paid on top of the basic remuneration for discharge of specific duties inherent in a given service.

Currently, retirement pensions are calculated according to a pattern that was operational over the past years. This pattern takes due account of the new size of pay set for servicemen of different rank and position, the size of monthly length-of-service increment and ruble equivalent of the ration allowance. Pensions of servicemen retired after July 1, 2002 have increased by 80-90 percent as compared to the level of the previous period. After January 1, 2003 the size of pensions was re-adjusted in view of increased monthly rank pay to active servicemen effective from that date. As a result, today’s pensions are more than double in size of what there was previously.

At the same time, retirement pension system needs further improvement and further efforts will be taken in this direction to reflect expected changes in military payroll system.

The housing problem is, beyond doubt, a key element of the servicemen’s social security package.

The current system regulating the provision of housing facilities to military personnel requires a cardinal change. Primarily, because it fails to put together a stable service housing stock. Moreover, its inefficiency brings about shrinkage of the stock already on hand. Due to limited resources of the federal budget, it currently takes a retired serviceman about 6-7 years (instead of the statutory 3 months) to vacate his temporarily occupied official accommodation facilities and move to a permanent housing space he is entitled to by law. At present, the Defence Ministry’s housing stock numbers 98,000 apartments. However, there are about 70,000 families in cantonments waiting for relocation. In all, to resolve the housing shortage problem and make sure that every serviceman had a roof above his head as long as he stays in the ranks, the Armed Forces need as many as 450,000 official apartments.

The current challenges in the housing sphere can be met only in case the state allocates more funds for the purpose. Another requirement is prompt transition to a cumulative scheme of supplying housing to servicemen.

It must be openly acknowledged that the situation in this area cannot be radically improved within a year or two as the housing problems have been neglected for several decades. Still, intensive efforts in making effective use of the existing official housing stock combined with continued activities under the ongoing "State Housing Certificates" program for the 2002-2010 period and the introduction of the innovative cumulative pattern of the allocation of housing to servicemen offer a realistic way out of what may appear an impasse.

By 2012-2015 the state plans to do away with the housing shortages and guarantee allocation of service housing to military personnel within one month.
To realize these plans, extensive housing development projects will be complemented with intensive efforts to transform barracks and other buildings vacated as a result of ongoing army reduction into suitable official accommodation facilities.

The Government of the Russian Federation has approved a plan envisaging preparation of appropriate regulatory legal documents and implementation of required organizational measures to introduce in 2004 the cumulative scheme of supplying housing to servicemen and their families.

A program for launching the cumulative scheme of supplying housing to servicemen has been developed by the Defence Ministry to create an effective mechanism for guaranteed provision of housing to military personnel. The program provides for accumulation of funds on the serviceman’s personal bank account so that after 20 years of service he could use the funds for purchasing a suitable apartment or house of a size corresponding to the accepted social norms and located in a region of his choice.

Should the serviceman opt to stay in the ranks for more than 20 years, the sums in his account would accrue further, enabling him to acquire an apartment or house of a size exceeding the social norm.

Introduction of the cumulative housing scheme will let servicemen enjoy the following social benefits:

◆ improved psychological atmosphere and enhanced moral standards in servicemen’s families and in military communities;
◆ servicemen’s confidence in securing suitable housing standards for their families;
◆ compensation for limitations imposed by military service as a special type of public service involving life risks;
◆ social justice;
◆ consolidation of servicemen’s status as citizens enjoying special protection of the state.

The Defence Ministry plans to implement a package of **other measures aimed at enhancing social security of soldiers and officers**. Due efforts are being taken to promote the implementation of the state-sponsored program "Social Adjustment of Servicemen to Be Retired from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Forces, Military Formations, and Agencies and Their Families in 2002-2005". Among other organizations, this program is being promoted by the Government’s commission on social security of servicemen, retired servicemen and their families as well as by the Federal All-Russia Centre for Retraining Retired Officers functioning, which is a Federal state military enterprise, under the Defence Ministry.

Recently, experts have drawn up a draft interdepartmental program "Rehabilitation of Servicemen, Retired Servicemen and Law Enforcement Officers Injured in the Line of Duty as Part of Combat and Antiterrorist Operations."

Urgent measures need to be taken to work out and adopt a federal program targeting comprehensive rehabilitation of disabled servicemen. Over the past six years their number has increased by 230,000 men to total 800,000 and continues to grow. The state and the whole society are indebted to these people who sacrificed their health to ensure peace and welfare for the country and its citizens.
Serious efforts are being taken at present to finalize introduction of a new model of Russian military medical service’s modus operandi. Medical service is a major social security component of the ongoing development of the country’s military organization. Departmental systems of medical support are to be optimized through further integration of the national military medical service’s assets and capabilities to ensure timely provision of effective medical aid to all servicemen, retirees and their families.

The concept of the new model is based on the assumption that the medical service system of the country’s military organization must be comprehensive by nature and commonly shared in application. Servicemen of the Armed Forces as well as of other forces and military formations must undergo medical examination and treatment in unified, instead of departmental, hospitals and clinics. The system must be based on the territorial principle whereby all medical facilities of the country’s military organization in a given military district provide aid to all military formations deployed in this district.

It needs to be emphasized that effective social security of servicemen is a matter of state significance. The Armed Forces do not have the resources to deal with it on their own. In our opinion, these issues must by all means be thoroughly discussed at the sessions of the State Council to ensure regional authorities’ involvement in meeting servicemen’s social (primarily, housing) needs.

**IMPROVEMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL AND MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM OF SERVICEMEN. PATRIOTIC GUIDANCE OF CITIZENS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Wars have always been won by people, not by weapons and military equipment, even if of the most
advanced nature. People operate weapons. In the end, it is people’s stamina and morale that determine success in the accomplishment of the combat task in hand. Therefore, such issues as military discipline and morale guidance have always been and will remain a prime concern of commanders at all levels of the military organization.

One should bear in mind that the development of the Russian military organization has been carried out in a complicated and controversial social, economic, political, ethnical, demographic, criminal and religious environment.

The social profile of the Russian Armed Forces sustained cardinal changes over the past decade. The educational level of the young men joining the ranks today has dropped substantially. Their physical and mental health has also deteriorated. The pacifist and anti-military sentiment is much more pronounced in today’s society. The religious and ethnic factors have also grown in relevance. Such factors as the growing number of neglected and homeless children, the widespread alcoholism and the spiraling rate of drug addiction among the country’s youth undermine the foundations of society as a whole.

The current criminal situation in the country also detrimentally affects the Armed Forces’ personnel. The crime rate in the ranks reflects general crime rate tendencies in the country. The organized crime is persistently trying to take root in the Armed Forces.

However, despite a massive impact of the aforementioned objective factors detrimentally affecting the crime situation in the ranks, the Armed Forces remain one of the most law-abiding institutions of the state. Crime rate among servicemen is half the country’s average.

At the same time, it may be advisable to consider a possibility of reverting to the practice of administrative arrest to enhance efficacy of measures aimed at preventing violations of military discipline in all forms.

Today, it is vitally important to improve the entire system of guidance and moral-psychological support of servicemen and enhance patriotic education of Russia’s citizens on the whole.

Servicemen’s high morale and combat spirit do not emerge of their own accord. They arise from consistent, purposeful and result-oriented efforts targeting the outlook, morale and mentality of the entire nation as well as individual citizens.

The above qualities cannot be imposed by a group of high-brow experts specializing in morale guidance. Originally, these qualities arise in the family to be subsequently patiently fostered, encouraged and advanced by different institutions of the state, public organizations, as well as mass media. Countries keen on safeguarding their national security interests spare neither material nor intellectual resources to ensure success of these efforts.

It appears necessary, in this respect, to develop and implement a federal program of military and political awareness for Russia’s citizens as well as a program of military and political education for the country’s servicemen. These could let every citizen better understand the origin, methods and conse-
quences of wars and the volume of costs incurred by nations and states as a result of wars.

The international and domestic experience in the military development proves that personnel’s psychological steadfastness, moral fibre and readiness to engage in combat operations constitute an inalienable element of the armed forces’ combat efficiency.

In general, the personnel’s moral-psychological state is high enough to ensure the successful fulfilment of the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces.

In the course of the counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus soldiers and officers on many occasions displayed their implicit faithfulness to the Fatherland. The feats accomplished there by Russian servicemen remind one of the heroism displayed by their fathers and grandfathers during the Great Patriotic War. The Russian Army has demonstrated its high combat readiness and ability to execute the decisions taken by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Armed Forces and Defence Ministry’s leadership.

Public opinion polls conducted in 2003 show that more than 87 percent of the Armed Forces’ officers support the steps currently taken in the sphere of military development, about 80 percent show high motivation in upgrading their professional skills, and over 70 percent have strong faith in their comrades-in-arms.

At present, due efforts are being taken to ensure the introduction of a unified system of military morale guidance in the Armed Forces, other forces, military formations and agencies within the framework of a program approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

Major efforts undertaken to improve the existing system of moral guidance in the ranks are focused on the implementation of government-sponsored measures aimed at maintaining servicemen’s moral-psychological state at a level guaranteeing reliable defence of the Russian Federation. In this
THE PRIORITY TASKS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

connection, effective methods for the enhancement of the personnel’s moral-psychological training should be developed and employed on the basis of advanced national and foreign research in order to ensure their readiness for contemporary warfare. A number of special projects and extensive research work need to be accomplished for the purpose.

Proper measures are also being taken to establish a permanent sociological support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in order to maintain continuous monitoring of social processes developing in the Armed Forces, to analyze problems relating to the socio-economic and legal status of servicemen, civilian personnel and their families, to evaluate the moral-psychological condition of different categories of servicemen, and to provide the supreme state and military authorities with express information describing the military personnel’s attitudes and opinions, as well as shifts in the latter.

The composition and structure of the moral guidance and information departments of the federal agencies of executive authority that have troops and military formations are to be streamlined and standardized before 2005. Their organizational and methodological base is to be duly reinforced.

The reformed system of morale guidance and psychological support of the military personnel will help the latter develop the necessary moral fibre, ethical basis of their motivation in combat, as well as readiness and capacity to successfully accomplish combat tasks assigned to them. In addition, the system will contribute to servicemen’s ability to actively engage in combat operations, sustain psychological stress and retain high combat efficiency.

It is impossible to safeguard Russia’s national security and modernize the country’s Armed Forces without consistent long-term work aimed at enhancing patriotic sentiment among Russian citizens, the young people, above all, and boosting the image of the country’s military system.

One has to admit that in recent years the military-patriotic education of the youth has been scaled down. The number of draft-age youths engaged in military-related sports has also dropped dramatically. According to the research recently conducted by the Russian Academy of Management, the words “patriot” and “patriotism” are increasingly perceived by the public as having a negative connotation. In 1987, as many as 93 percent of respondents in a similar poll regarded themselves as patriots; today this percentage has dropped to 23 percent. This sentiment manifests itself most vividly in the young people’s attitude toward conscription. Today, many draft-age youths do their utmost to evade their constitutional duty to defend the Motherland.

The mistakes and negligence in such a vital sector as patriotic and military guidance of youths result in a sharp decline of prestige of the military service. What makes things worse is the fact that the resultant vacuum may be used by diverse radical organizations seeking to indoctrinate the immature minds with extremist, and even fascist, ideas. The reassessment and erosion of moral foundations and patriotic senti-
ments have brought about a situation when the increasing percentage of conscripts join the ranks after serving time in correctional institutions. Many draftees have a record of juvenile delinquency, quite a lot of them are alcohol or drug addicts. Given the fact that the Armed Forces keep an arsenal of nuclear and other highly hazardous weapons, the foregoing may entail very adverse consequences.

The system of the physical education of young people continues to disintegrate against the backdrop of increasingly deteriorating health of the draft-age youths. Many people no longer remember that quite recently there were two popular physical fitness standards in the country - "Ready for Work and Defence” and "Ready to Defend Motherland." Given numerous inadequacies inherent in the enforcement of these standards, one cannot deny, however, their positive impact on the physical fitness of the country’s youths. Stadiums used to be the venues of sports activities, whereas today many of them have been converted into markets selling clothes and other merchandize. Sports facilities in most educational establishments fall short in the accepted standards, nobody monitors
the physical condition of would-be draftees, and nobody has effective criteria for its comprehensive assessment.

Millions of neglected and homeless children in the country are a problem of a particularly poignant national significance and one of the bitterest signs of our time. The state sees the solution of this problem as one of its primary objectives, and the Defence Ministry is making their contribution to the cause.

Only now, when the country has practically lost a whole generation, society is gradually becoming aware of how ruinous the previous course was, with its neglect for military and patriotic guidance of the population and physical training of young people for the defence of their Motherland.

Fortunately, positive changes are currently underway in this area. In the past few years, pre-service military training camps for high school students have been set up on the grounds of some units of the Moscow garrison and the Moscow Military District. Museums of military glory have reopened in secondary schools of many cities and towns across Russia. Many communities have resumed a good tradition of holding sports competitions for would-be conscripts, and "Sons of the Motherland" competitions. More large-scale initiatives are required, however, to reverse detrimental trends in this sphere.

Introduction and encouragement of patriotic and military guidance of the population must become a priority for both the state and society as a whole. It must become a major component of pre-service
training activities aimed at promoting preparedness of Russian citizens to defend their Motherland. The latter is the main objective of the state-sponsored program "Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation in 2001-2005."

The state must also do its utmost to create positive public perception of the role played by the country’s military organization in the life of society, in ensuring effective defence of the Russian Federation, safeguarding the national security, making contribution to Russia’s revival, and strengthening its international authority.

The bodies of all levels of authority can and must render comprehensive support for military-and-patriotic associations and military sports clubs which bring together war veterans, youths and children. The routine but highly useful and committed work of these organizations is often inconspicuous and low-profile, but they are making an invaluable contribution to the cause of moulding up a nation of patriots.

Re-establishment of pre-service military training at educational institutions will play an important role in enhancing preparedness of young people for the military service.

The military and patriotic guidance of citizens as well as pre-service training must be re-established in educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of all forms of ownership before 2005.

Due efforts must be taken to improve the program of training citizens in military occupational specialties at the ROSTO (Russian Defence Sports and Technical Organization) system, primary, and secondary vocational schools, and public associations.

It is necessary to continue searching for new forms and methods of encouraging more active involvement of the media in the military and patriotic guidance activities, resurrection of the Russian historic tradition of cultivating patriotic awareness of the people through reflection of heroic achievements in literature, art and culture. Extensive participation of Russia’s intellectual elite in this noble cause will be viewed as a memorable example of their dedicated stewardship for the sake of the Russian people and may become a guarantee of success in this vital endeavour of the national importance.

Additional efforts will be needed in order to optimize and unify the composition and structure of the educational guidance and information departments of the federal agencies of executive authority to maintain armed forces and military formations. Appropriate organizational and methodological enhancement of these formations will also be carried out in due course.